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It is a June evening in the City of Light, and the sun is setting on the Rue du
Faubourg Saint-Honore. As the last remaining customers in a posh boutique finish their
browsing and stride toward the cashiers, a beleaguered saleswoman places a “closed”
sign in the window. Meanwhile, other employees begin readying the facilities for a
private shopping event that is to occur momentarily. Just then, a small group of American
tourists approaches the front door, seeking admittance. The saleswoman refuses to let
them in, insisting that the store is closed, notwithstanding the presence of customers
inside. Harsh words are spoken, pleas for admittance are ignored, and the humiliated
Americans eventually retreat to their hotel rooms clutching unspent Euros.
This episode, or something like it, surely occurs each day in Paris. It’s hardly
news. But on the evening in question, the episode generated international headlines, and
for good reason. The rebuffed tourists included Oprah Winfrey, one of America’s most
famous, beloved, and wealthy women.1 Pundits debated whether race and national origin
played a part in the saleswoman’s behavior, and argued over whether it was reasonable
for Oprah and her entourage to request admittance after normal business hours. But lost
in all the analysis was an important point: Nothing like this could have happened on
Madison Avenue or Rodeo Drive.
In a few decades, the story of Oprah and the subsequently disciplined Parisian
saleswoman will seem quaint. Reputation is becoming increasingly portable, and there is
every reason to think that accurate assessments of our reputations and attributes will
follow us from New York to Paris to Katmandu, such that Oprah will get the A-list
treatment wherever she may go. Our cities and suburbs are increasingly going to
resemble the small towns of lore, for better and worse. People who behave rudely in the
presence of others will have a hard time hiding behind their anonymity or practical
obscurity, and the fear of reputational sanctions will help keep us in line more often than
not. Mistaken identity, judging books by their covers, con-jobs – all these pathologies
resulting from asymmetric information will become increasingly rare, though the
availability of personalized reputation information will generate new problems and
challenges. This paper asks what the law should look like in a world of increasingly

1

Alessandra Stanley, The TV Watch: Oprah, No Diva She, Accepts Hermes Apology on the Air, N.Y.
Times, Sep. 20, 2005, at B2.
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ubiquitous personal information. It examines how a fundamental change in information
economics should alter the way we think about landlord-tenant, antidiscrimination, jury
selection, prescription drug abuse, insurance, immigration, and consumer protection law.
More provocatively, it advocates something that few academics and no privacy advocates
presently favor – adopting government policies that will hasten the widespread
availability of previously private consumer information in some contexts.
This paper completes a trilogy of projects theorizing the relationship between
information and exclusion. In the first paper, I argued that in settings where real estate
developers sought to exclude subpopulations from a community but were prohibited from
doing so explicitly by law, they might achieve their exclusionary objective by bundling
community membership with a costly collective amenity that would be unpalatable to
most members of the targeted subpopulation.2 In the second paper, I developed a broader
hypothesis about why a resource owner would opt for one exclusionary strategy over
another – excluding through mechanisms based on trespass law when the owner had
sufficient information about which prospective applicants were undesirable, and using
non-trespass-based mechanisms, such as exclusionary language or bundling, when
significant information asymmetries were present.3 In this paper, I examine a brave new
world of radically diminishing information asymmetries and explain how that
information shock will unsettle existing assumptions about law and public policy.4
Part I of this paper identifies a number of contexts in which the widespread
availability of information about individuals can transform commercial and social
interactions. It then suggests that in some of these settings it will be appropriate for the
government to reduce to costs that decisionmakers face in obtaining relevant information
about individuals, so that decisionmakers can rely more heavily on that relevant
information and decrease their reliance on (less relevant but more easily observable)
proxies, such as racial or ethnic status, gender, or age.
Part II identifies a number of pragmatic concerns that can help us determine when
it is appropriate for the government to facilitate greater information flow. It suggests that,
2

Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 Va. L. Rev. 437 (2006).
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1835
(2006).
4
Predictably, the three papers are in the process of being integrated into a book, forthcoming with Yale
University Press, tentatively titled A Theory of Information and Exclusion.
3
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ceteris paribus, it is desirable for the government to promote the publication of
information about individuals when rational discrimination is common, but irrational
discrimination is uncommon. The Part then briefly explores the challenges posed by false
feedback or other forms of misinformation, and differentiates between those settings
where the government should itself publish previously private information, and those in
which it should facilitate the aggregation or standardization of data that other parties have
acquired or published.
Part III tackles a number of normative objections to the use of government
information policy as a tool for tackling unlawful discrimination and other social ills. It
notes that in some contexts, statistical discrimination must be tolerated, because society
has determined that the information the decisionmaker would like to have is not
information to which he ought to have access. It then discusses the distributive justice
consequences of the information policy regime discussed herein, and explores whether
information-based strategies for combating social ills. Finally, the part examines the
desirability of living in a society where citizens’ conduct is frequently evaluated and
those evaluations are made widely available, with a brief discussion of the emerging
pertinent empirical literature. A brief conclusion follows.

I.

The Reputation Revolution and the Law
One of the most significant developments in the industrialized world during the

last decade has been the increased availability of information about individuals. Personal
information that was once obscure can be revealed almost instantaneously via a Google
search. The flea market transaction, in which a consumer had to hope that a vendor was
trustworthy, has been largely displaced by the eBay auction, where a prospective bidder
can review information about hundreds of the seller’s prior transactions, in an effort to
ensure that the seller is trustworthy, prompt, courteous, and the like. Anxious parents
thinking about purchasing in an unfamiliar neighborhood can acquire information about
all the registered sex offenders living nearby, complete with comprehensive information
about their crimes, via a few keystrokes. Sizing up a potential blind date to get a sense of
his peer group – a task that was once arduous and blatant – has now become easy and
discreet, thanks to Facebook, Myspace, and similar social networking sites. A car seller
4 of 82

can comfortably show a consumer a new car and let her drive it home, having paid for the
vehicle with little or no money down, thanks to the comprehensive and nearly
instantaneous credit checks that now take place on the dealer’s lot. And we can even
assess the credibility of people we have no expectation of ever meeting – the amateur
movie critic on Netflix, the amateur book reviewer on Amazon, or the amateur
commentator on Slashdot – I can look up their respective histories of movie, book, and
article reviews, to see how seriously I should take their recent review of Ratatouille, A
Thousand Splendid Suns, or a blog post reviewing the new iPod Nano. Reputation
tracking technologies are being used to track customer’s preferences and quirks, too. For
example, Open Table, the popular online reservations system for restaurants, tracks
dining patron tendencies – If I repeatedly show up late for reservations, Open Table will
alert restaurateurs so that they know to expect me fifteen minutes after my stated
reservation time.5 In short, the anonymity and pseudonymity that once characterized our
interactions with strangers is fading. I will refer to this change as the “reputation
revolution.”
In the years ahead, it seems likely that existing imperfections in the reputation
market will dissipate. For example, it is presently difficult for an individual to translate a
strong offline reputation into a strong online reputation. eBay does not let users take their
existing brick-and-mortar reputations into the online auction world. So, a well-established
merchant in a small town with lots of satisfied customers providing her repeat business
gets zero feedback points upon opening a new eBay account, just like everyone else.
Because a strong feedback score permits a seller to obtain higher prices for sold goods, 6
the new entrant on eBay thus may have to sell goods with a discounted reserve price in
order to build up the positive reputation that will allow her to compete effectively with
established online sellers. This is a significant market inefficiency, and it will be
surprising if the market does not address it. More precisely, we might expect to see metaranking sites that make reputation more readily transferable from one online forum to
another, and between online and offline marketplaces. More radically, we might expect to
5

Katie Hafner, Service at Restaurants Changing Subtly with Online Information, N.Y. Times, June 18,
2007, at C1.
6
See, e.g., Paul Resnick et al., The Value of Reputation on eBay: A Controlled Experiment, 9 Exp. Econ.
79, 80-81, 96 (2006).
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see the emergence of services that track the reputations of individuals in comprehensive
ways. Just as each American has a credit score that banks, lenders, landlords and others
can access before determining whether and on what terms to do business with us, we can
envision the emergence of “social credit scores,” where individuals’ personality traits are
assessed, and translated into a profile that gauges trustworthiness, sociability,
cooperativeness, and popularity based on data from a variety of online and offline
resources. Such profiling already occurs – indeed, it is old news – in the online
advertising realm.7
As technologies improve, the reputation revolution has to potential to alter not
only considered judgments with obvious economic and social consequences, like the
decision to purchase a car, buy a home, go on a date, or acquire a pair of Nikes. In these
settings we would hope that the decisionmaker will conduct some research before
electing a course of action. In the near future, it is plausible that information about
individuals will seep into interactions where it is presently unavailable. Such interactions
require split-second decisions, but technologies being developed for the mass market will
enable us to take advantage of the reputation revolution anyway in making those
decisions. A concrete example will be useful.
It is late at night, and an unaccompanied adult is walking home. There are no
pedestrians or moving vehicles immediately visible, but a 24-hour pharmacy stands
across the street. The adult suddenly sees a group of five male teenagers turn the corner.
The teens are now walking directly toward the adult. Will the pedestrian cross the street,
perhaps entering the pharmacy for a moment? The answer probably will depend on a
series of proxies: What race are the teenagers? How are they dressed? How are they
interacting with one another? In a split second, and with potentially high stakes, the first
question may prove decisive in guiding the adult’s response to this situation. The adult
may well cross the street out of caution, and then feel ashamed after receiving quizzical
or bemused looks from the probably harmless teenagers.

7

See, e.g., Wayne R. Barnes, Rethinking Spyware: Questioning the Propriety of Contractual Consent to
Online Surveillance, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1545, 1550-57 (2006); Lee Kovarsky, Note, Tolls on the
Information Superhighway: Entitlement Defaults for Clickstream Data, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1037, 1042-47
(2003); Brad Stone, Myspace to Discuss Efforts to Customize Ads, N.Y. Times, Sep. 18, 2007, at __.
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Given presently available technology, we have a hard time understanding the
application of a strategy to give the pedestrian more relevant information so he can rely
less on race or wardrobe information. But wearable computers that are already being
tested and rolled out permit precisely those types of calculations. In the past few years,
our old-school cell phones have seen the addition of cameras, text-messaging, email
capabilities, global positioning system, and mp3 player functionalities. In a few more
years, they are likely to integrate impressive social networking capabilities as well.
Computer scientists have now spent a decade researching, implementing, and writing
about wearable communities, which employ ubiquitous computing resources to help
provide individuals with information about the people and products around them.8 These
technologies have many functionalities, but among the most promising is an application
of social networking sites like Myspace and Facebook into real space. In November of
2007, Google announced that it was spearheading an effort to bring next generation social
networking software applications to smart-phones, and that 33 other technology firms,
including Motorola, Samsung, Sprint, T-Mobile, eBay, and Intel, had pledged to
cooperate in that effort.9
If everyone is carrying around a wearable computer that can talk to everyone
else’s wearable computer, then at a moment’s notice, I might be able to discern whether
anyone else in a café has seen the movie I just saw.10 While waiting in line at the grocery
store or box office, I might be alerted to the presence of a friend-of-a-friend just behind
me. That functionality is something that existing web sites like Dodgeball.com already
enable. And given those existing technologies, it is a short leap to a world in which
having told my wearable computer that I am looking for an electrician, I might learn that
8

See, e.g., ADAM GREENFIELD, EVERYWARE: THE DAWNING AGE OF UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING (2006);
Marije Kanis et al., Toward Wearable Social Networking with iBand, CHI Conference Late Breaking
Results 1521 (2005); Gerd Kortuem & Zary Segall, Wearable Communities: Augmenting Social Networks
with Wearable Computers, Pervasive Computing 11 (Jan.-Mar. 2003); Steve Mann et al., Sousveillance:
Inventing and Using Wearable Computing Devices for Data Collection in Surveillance Environments, 1
Surveillance & Society 331 (2003); Michael Terry et al., Social Net: Using Patterns of Physical Proximity
over Time to Infer Shared Interests, Extended Abstracts of the ACM Conference on Human Factors in
Computing Systems 816 (2002). For a technical overview about various wearable community projects, see
Roy L. Ashok & Dharma P. Agrawal 36 IEEE Computer 31 (Nov. 2003). The primary legal treatment of
this subject is Jerry Kang and Dana Cuff’s thoughtful article, Pervasive Computing: Embedding the Public
Sphere, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93 (2005).
9
Miguel Helft & John Markoff, Google Discloses Plans to Put a PC into Every Pocket, N.Y. Times, Nob.
6, 2007, at C1.
10
Kang & Cuff, supra note 8, at 131.
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there is an available electrician in aisle six at Home Depot, that a trusted colleague
employed the electrician recently and rated his performance 9 out of 10, and that the
electrician has experience doing the sorts of lighting rewiring jobs that I need done.
These sorts of technologies can help us navigate the everyday snap judgments
about how to interact with strangers on a mostly deserted block. My computer might tell
me that the five youths approaching late at night are honors students or dropouts with
long rap sheets.11 And if my computer can tell me that, a police officer’s wearable
computer can tell him just as much, diminishing the likelihood of racial profiling and
tragic mistakes.12 My computer could tell me whether the individual who just cut me off
on the freeway has a history of violence and vehicular collisions, or is a surgeon likely
racing to the hospital. Summary statistics, much like eBay’s reputation scores or
Slashdot’s karma points, could flash on my screen, to tell me that the teens are
trustworthy and trusted by people I trust, but that the driver is someone with a violent
temper who is best avoided.
Of course, if it is late at night and I am being approached by teenagers with
suspicious intentions, do I really want to be pulling out a portable computer and scanning
at an eBay profile? If a taxi driver has to decide whether to pick up an African American
pedestrian late at night, won’t statistical discrimination always be more palatable than
spending ten seconds evaluating the pedestrian’s reputation score?
These are fair questions, but they are ones with comforting answers – the problem
raised by these examples have already been addressed in e-commerce. In e-commerce,
automated negotiation protocols allow users who own devices that can communicate with
other users’ devices to set the parameters for such communication. For example, these

11

See Kang & Cuff, supra note 8, at 133-34; see also Mark A. Blythe et al., Little Brother: Could and
Should Wearable Computing Technologies Be Applied to Reducing Older People’s Fear of Crime, 8 Pers.
Ubiquitous Comput. 402, 407-12 (2004) (describing the potential for wearable computing technologies to
address the information problems that underlie urban crime).
12
The People’s Republic of China is beginning to use wearable computers and identity management
systems to help the police keep track of the government’s contacts with its civilian population, as well as
the citizenry’s movements through public spaces. See Keith Bradsher, China Enacting a High-Tech Plan
to Track People, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 2007, at __. Less disconcertingly, Maryland is developing the
capacity for police officers to conduct criminal background checks via squad-car based terminals, as well
as enabling biometric identification. See Philip J. Weiser, Communicating During Emergencies: Toward
Interoperability and Effective Information Management, 57 Fed. Comm. L.J. 547, 564 (2007).
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protocols have been implemented in digital rights management, p3p systems,13 and
wearable communities. In such environments, automated negotiation lets users specify
what levels of trust are necessary before their digital media device will download content
from another device or web site; they permit users to identify in advance what privacyprotection characteristics a web site offers and only show users items for sale from web
sites that meet the specified criteria; or they allow someone participating in a wearable
community to request notification whenever someone else approaches whose wearable
computer indicates specified attributes (unmarried, fellow Hoosier, Decembrists fan,
etc.). Our hypothetical taxi driver might program his computer to notify him whenever a
university student, nurse, or airline pilot seeking a cab is in the vicinity, but assign lower
priority to taxi requests from those who are currently unemployed and provide an audible
warning beep whenever a proximate convicted felon tries to hail a cab. Alternatively, the
taxi driver might identify 50 cab drivers who he trusts, and pick up any passenger who
had received positive feedback from any of those cab drivers.14
Under the law, of course, a taxi company is a common carrier, with an obligation
to provide service to everyone.15 But let us not kid ourselves. Cab drivers routinely avoid
picking up African Americans, often avoid serving African American neighborhoods
entirely, and resist efforts to enforce antidiscrimination laws.16 As we will see shortly,
information asymmetries currently cause taxi drivers to sort on the basis of race and
gender when picking up rides, penalizing both the African American male gang member
and the African American male clergyman. A technology that allows sorting between
gang members and clergymen makes the world a better place than the one in which we
live, where the only decisionmaking factors available to the cab driver are the
information revealed by quick visual inspection (race, gender, dress, etc.).
To be sure, there are technological impediments and consumer preference
impediments to the implementation of these technologies. Networking capabilities will
13

p3p stands for platform for privacy preferences.
He might well decide to extend the circle of trust by one degree – trusting favorable feedback from any
of his 50 cabbie friends, or any of his 50 cabbie friends’ friends – a community of interest that could well
include many of the cab drivers in town.
15
Ian Ayres et al., To Insure Prejudice: Racial Disparities in Taxicab Tipping, 114 Yale L.J. 1613, 1624
(2005).
16
See Danita L. Davis, Note, Taxi! Why Hailing a New Idea about Public Accommodation Laws May be
Easier than Hailing a Taxi, 37 Val. U. L. Rev. 929 (2003).
14
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have to improve somewhat, kinks will have to be worked out of the existing wearable
computing operating software, and consumers will have to decide that the socialization
gains from these technologies warrant the associated loss of privacy. No significant
hypothesis in this paper depends on the successful implementation of each of these
technologies. But the preceding discussion is designed to open the reader’s eyes to the
dramatic nature of the reputation revolution that has already occurred in the past decade
and the non-fanciful possibility that equally dramatic changes lie ahead in the next ten
years.
A.

Existing Scholarship on Consumer Information and Discrimination

The rise of social networking web sites, consumer information databases, Internet
blogs, and online feedback systems have not made scholars who write about privacy law
happy. In a series of books and articles, these scholars have bemoaned the disappearance
of anonymity, the loss of autonomy, and the dangers of shame sanctions that have
accompanied these trends.17 One influential and important part of that critique began in
1993 with Oscar Gandy’s book, The Panoptic Sort,18 and remains vibrant and visible
today thanks to work by David Lyon and other surveillance studies scholars.19 According
to Gandy and Lyon, the growth of technology-aided surveillance, consumer information
databases, and other mechanisms for accessing increased information about individuals
facilitates pernicious forms of discrimination – what Gandy calls “the panoptic sort” and
Lyon calls “social sorting.” It prevents governments from treating citizens alike, and

17

See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION
AGE (2004); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE
INTERNET (2007); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Information Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 Stan.
L. Rev. 1373 (2000); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 461 (2000); Oscar H.
Gandy Jr., Quixotics Unite! Engaging the Pragmatists on Rational Discrimination, in Theorizing
Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond 318 (David Lyon ed. 2006). Stan Karas, Privacy, Identity,
Databases, 52 Am. U. L. Rev. 393 (2002); Matthew J. Hodge, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and
Privacy Issues on the “New” Internet: Facebook.Com and Myspace.Com, 31 S. Ill. U. L.J. 95 (2006).
18
OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION (1993).
19
See, e.g., THEORIZING SURVEILLANCE: THE PANOPTICON AND BEYOND (David Lyon ed. 2006);
SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING: PRIVACY , RISK, AND DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION (David Lyon ed.
2003).
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similarly prevents firms from treating consumers as an undifferentiated mass. As a result,
people are categorized, grouped, divided, and treated in disturbingly differential ways.20
This paper argues that Gandy and Lyon misapprehend the relationship between
discrimination and the availability of personal information. The increased availability of
information about individuals will prompt some decisionmakers to shift from not sorting
to sorting, as Gandy and Lyon argue. But it will prompt other decisionmakers to shift
from sorting via problematic group-based stereotypes to less problematic, more
individuated judgments. The key questions, as I explain below, are the magnitudes and
social welfare consequences of the two relevant shifts.
Before the developed world made heavy investments in its reputational
infrastructure,21 citizens and consumers were not treated equally. Governments sorted
citizens and firms sorted consumers then, as now. The difference between our present age
and prior epochs was not the temptation of sorting, but the basis for sorting. Lacking
comprehensive consumer information databases, criminal history databases, Google
searches, Myspace profiles, and the like, institutions interested in sorting used easily
available criteria like race, gender, and age to sort Americans. When Gandy, Lyon, and
other scholars writing in the surveillance studies tradition advocate greater privacy
protections as a mechanism for decreasing discrimination, they (unwittingly) propose
policies that will shift sorting techniques away from relatively unproblematic criteria like
purchasing patterns, social affiliations, criminal histories, insolvency records, and
Internet browsing behavior, back toward the old sorting standbys – race, gender, and age.
Often, the choice is not between sorting and no-sorting; the economic and social gains
from sorting are simply too great, and banning sorting in many contexts will be
simultaneously costly and not terribly effective. Rather, the real choice is between sorting
on the basis of uncomfortable criteria and sorting on the basis of obnoxious and
distasteful criteria.
This section takes stock of the enormous changes that industrialized democracies
have seen in the past couple of decades, and asks, in a systematic and sustained way,
20

See GANDY, supra note 18, at 71-93; David Lyon, Surveillance as Social Sorting: Computer Codes and
Mobile Bodies, in SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING, supra note 19, at 13, 13-28.
21
Reputational infrastructure consists of the technologies that enable information about individuals’ actions
and reputations to circulate efficiently among members of society.
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what the law should do to respond to those changes. It explores how the widespread
availability of information about individuals has already transformed the landlord tenant
market, and then analyzes the law’s initial responses to this revolution in the context of
employment discrimination, jury selection, medical treatment decisions, immigration law,
consumer protection law, and the law of defamation. In all these settings, courts and
policymakers are beginning to confront the new informational environment, but have not
fully thought through its implications for legal doctrine and policy. The discussion
illustrates that context matters, such that the law’s optimal response in one racial
discrimination context – hiring – should differ from its response in another racial
discrimination context – jury selection.
B.
Landlord-Tenant Law
Before looking forward it is always wise to look back. The reputation revolution
transformed the landlord-tenant market long before it altered many other aspects of
economic life. A brief case study will illustrate the basic trend that this paper describes:
reliance on poor sorting proxies when accurate proxies are costly to obtain, a shift to
reliance on those accurate proxies when the cost of obtaining high-quality information
drops, and a myopic reaction by policymakers who failed to anticipate the consequences
of the reputation revolution. Reforms designed to protect down-on-their-luck tenants
from landlord abuses in the 1960’s have, ironically, relegated some current tenants to a
reputational underclass, whose members have a hard time renting decent units even after
achieving some measure of financial stability. But I am getting ahead of myself. Let us
begin with an anecdote that underscores how freely circulating personal information
affects the rental market.
During the 1970s and 1980s, it was not unusual for landlords in New York City to
refuse to rent apartments to lawyers.22 At first blush, this seems like an odd trend. Us
lawyers may be loathed by the public, but we typically bring home a nice paycheck. A
New York City landlord who refused to rent to lawyers would be depriving himself of
many prospective, well-heeled tenants. The explanation for this seemingly irrational
landlord conduct was a proxy story. As one landlord explained to a New York court, his

22

See JESSIE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 382 (6th ed. 2006) and sources cited therein.
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refusal to rent an apartment to a qualified attorney applicant was based on his preference
for “a person who was likely to be less informed and more passive” rather than someone
“attuned to her legal rights.”23 That court noted that lawyers were not a protected class
under fair housing laws, and therefore ruled in the landlord’s favor.24 It took nine years,
but New York City eventually prohibited discrimination in the housing market on the
basis of profession, at the urging of lawyers who had similar troubles finding rental units
in the city.25
The 1986 enactment of New York City’s profession-based fair housing
protections did not prompt the city’s landlords to wave the white flag on tenant screening.
Landlords still wanted to screen out those tenants who seemed likely to invoke their
rights under New York’s landlord-tenant laws. Some landlords responded by continuing
to avoid renting to lawyers, but offering instead some pretext – new or old.26 But other
landlords stopped relying on profession-as-a-proxy, and started relying on involvement in
prior litigation as a proxy for litigiousness. Information brokers began data-mining state
and municipal court records, hoping to identify tenants who had been involved in
landlord-tenant litigation of any sort.27 Tenants who have gotten themselves involved in
such litigation were essentially blacklisted by those landlords.28 In such a world, even
tenants who had won suits against their landlords face a difficult time obtaining housing.
As the founder of a tenant screening company told the New York Times, “It is the policy
of 99 percent of our customers in New York to flat out reject anybody with a landlordtenant record, no matter what the reason is and no matter what the outcome is, because if
their dispute has escalated to going to court, an owner will view them as a pain.”29 In
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New York, at least, even sex offenders seem to have an easier time finding a place to
live.30
On one account tenant screening services are popular in New York precisely
because landlord-tenant regulations in that city slant so heavily in the direction of
tenants.31 Faced with high eviction and litigation costs, landlords devote more resources
to trying to screen out prospective tenants who pose heightened risks of future legal
entanglements. This screening presents a social problem, because society has an interest
in ensuring that the landlord-tenant laws are enforced, and the common law system
requires the help of plaintiffs who generate appellate cases, the resolution of which will
clarify the law.32 Landlord-tenant law, as it exists in ordinances and case law, bears little
resemblance to the set of rules that govern every day relations between landlords and
tenants. The reputational consequences of involvement in litigation are so severe that a
rational tenant should often elect not to seek enforcement of the substantive entitlements
provided by formal law. In this environment, it is safe to wonder whether landlord-tenant
clinics should even exist in their current form. Shouldn’t a legal aid attorney advise an
indigent client that involvement in landlord-tenant litigation is likely to be
counterproductive in the long run? Pro-tenant regulations, in short, might not make
tenants better off, though they do seem to improve the lot of tenant screening firms.
This dynamic explains why some of the landlord-tenant reforms of the 1960s and
1970s, which were supported by well-meaning tenants’ rights advocates, may have
ultimately backfired. One such reform is the prohibition on self-help evictions by
landlords and tenants. At common law, landlords were able to evict tenants who had
violated the terms of their lease, provided that the landlords did not use excessive or
unreasonable force.33 Beginning in the 1960s, a legal reform effort was begun by tenant
advocates who argued that legal process should be the exclusive means of ousting a
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Rudy Kleysteuber, Tenant Screening Thirty Years Later: A Statutory Proposal to Protect Public
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tenant in possession.34 That reform movement was premised on the view that self-help
evictions tend to spark violence between the landlord and tenant, and that unless checked
by the courts, some landlords would evict tenants who had a legal right to remain on the
premises.35 Although some states still permit self-help by landlords, their ranks have been
shrinking, and even the jurisdictions that permit landlords to use reasonable force in selfhelp evictions have defined “reasonable force” so narrowly that self help has become a
“theoretical but not a practical alternative.”36
The movement to prohibit self-help evictions by landlords has long had a few
critics, with the most prominent ones suggesting that landlords would pass the high costs
of judicially evicting deadbeat tenants onto the tenants who paid their bills on time.37
Some passing on of these costs undoubtedly occurs, but the reputation revolution
suggests a deeper criticism of the prohibitions on landlord self help. Eviction via self help
typically creates no public records. Courts are not involved in a self-help eviction, and a
landlord has no economic incentive to report such a dispossession to a credit bureau or
any other information broker.38 Evictions via summary proceedings, on the other hand,
necessarily generate public records, and it is those public records that will prove so
damaging to a tenant the next time he or she tries to rent an apartment. From the
perspective of facilitating tenant rehabilitation and second chances, a law prohibiting self
help by landlords will prove counterproductive. Many tenants who have trouble making
rent payments will fail to appreciate the reputational repercussions of involvement in
summary proceedings. For these tenants, the law’s prohibition on self help can be a
particularly raw deal. This is a point overlooked by defenders of the prohibition on selfhelp.39
34
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Tenants’ rights advocates who appreciate the ways in which earlier reforms have
produced unintended consequences are not powerless to address this situation. If society
believes that second chances are important in the landlord-tenant context, then it might
require that information about involvement in landlord-tenant litigation be purged from
consumers’ credit reports after a relatively brief period of time. Currently, the Fair Credit
Reporting Act requires that information about someone’s involvement in landlord-tenant
litigation be removed from his credit report after seven years.40 But a seven-year cloud on
one’s suitability as a tenant will still impose substantial harms on tenants who become
involved in litigation. During the 1990s, California tried to address this broader concern
legislatively, prohibiting credit reporting agencies from including information about a
tenant’s involvement in landlord-tenant litigation where the tenant was the prevailing
party. Alas, this legislation was invalidated by the courts on First Amendment grounds.41
In short, legislators cannot easily prevent landlords from receiving information about
tenants’ prior involvement in litigation. They can try to ban landlords from acting on that
information, but the enforcement of such prohibitions, like the enforcement of other antidiscrimination provisions that regulate decisionmakers’ behavior, will be spotty,
expensive, and prone to false positives.
Let us survey landlord-tenant law in the twenty-first century. Tenant background
checks have gotten so cheap that for many tenants, involvement in litigation of any sort
will place meaningful constraints on their future ability to obtain rental housing. These
tenants’ apartment search costs will be very high, since landlords do not advertise their
unwillingness to rent to people who have previously been involved in litigation.
Assuming non-trivial vacancy levels, some landlords will be willing to rent to those who
have been evicted in summary proceedings or sought to vindicate their legal rights, but
only after extracting higher rents and security deposits. In such a world, the only tenants
who should be willing to defend their rights in court are those who have previously
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15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2000).
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litigated and those with the ability to purchase housing. It seems like a hopeless world for
a tenants’ rights advocate. But such an advocate should not lose all hope.
There are two sides to every reputational coin, and that is equally true of this
particular doubloon. Just as a substantial market has developed for tenant screening
services, the market has also produced clearinghouses for information about landlords’
reputation. In a prior era, these were confined mainly to university housing offices, where
students could swap stories about the good, bad, and ugly landlords.42 And in markets
where prospective tenants often hire brokers to assist in their searches, brokers who
depend on repeat business and positive word of mouth will have an incentive to learn
which landlords behave inappropriately. Not surprisingly, the Internet has given rise to
far more sophisticated resources for tenants. The most encouraging among them is
Apartmentratings.com, a web site that contains tens of thousands of landlord ratings,
written by current and former tenants. This and some similar web sites provide a wealth
of information that would not easily be discerned in their absence, and their existence
gives tenants some recourse in dealing with recalcitrant or bullying landlords.43 To the
extent that web sites like these are used by prospective tenants, landlords should fear
developing a reputation for unfair or overly aggressive behavior. The best check on
landlord misbehavior is probably not the threat of a lawsuit by the tenant, but the threat of
a series of complaints by aggrieved and eloquent tenants.
At present, an information asymmetry exists. Apartmentratings.com is not as
extensive or reliable as web sites that monitor hotels and restaurants, like
tripadvisor.com. Impressionistic evidence suggests that it is underutilized, and that the
web site devotes fewer resources than tripadvisor does to ensuring that actual tenants (as
opposed to landlords and their kin) are responsible for the reviews that appear therein.
But as landlord-tenant law recedes into the background, we can expect that the demand
for services like apartmentratings.com will expand, and this added demand will induce
Apartmentratings.com to provide a better service or be driven out by competitors offering
a superior product.
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Summarizing the landlord-tenant market, then, we see themes playing out that
will become familiar refrains as you proceed through this paper. Where information costs
are high, landlords will use rough proxies, like occupation, to sort out litigious or
otherwise undesirable prospective tenants. As reputational information becomes far more
widely available through commercial data brokers, landlords reduce their reliance on
these proxies and begin blacklisting those prospective tenants with previous involvement
in litigation. As a result of this transformation, landlord-tenant reforms designed to help
tenants and constrain landlords have actually had the opposite effect, creating far more
extensive public records of litigation that have tarred some tenants with undesirable
status. In the short term, the result is tenant litigants being surprised by the reputational
implications of trying to vindicate their rights through legal process. In the long run the
effect will be a substantial deterrent to litigation in the landlord-tenant arena. This deemphasis on litigation may be tolerable, however, if existing resources designed to track
and monitor landlords’ reputations become more reliable and widely used.
C.

Antidiscrimination Law

There are two basic forms of discrimination: animus-based discrimination and
statistical discrimination. Animus-based discrimination occurs when an individual treats
members of a group differently because of (conscious or unconscious) antipathy toward
that group. Statistical discrimination arises occurs when an individual treats members of a
group differently because he believes that group membership correlates with some
attribute that is both relevant and more difficult to observe than group membership.44
Someone engaged in statistical discrimination would not harbor any ill will toward
members of the group against which he is discriminating, beyond the belief that
membership in that group correlates with some undesirable characteristic. To continue
with our first example, a landlord who refuses to rent to lawyers because he fears litigious
tenants and thinks lawyers are more likely to be litigious is engaging in statistical
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discrimination. A landlord who will not rent to lawyers because he hates lawyers is an
animus-based discriminator.
Statistical discrimination is a likely explanation for instances in which
decisionmakers who themselves belong to a minority group nevertheless make decisions
that favor majority group members over minority group members. For example, recent
newspaper accounts suggest that nannies generally prefer to work for Caucasian clients
over African American clients. African American clients were widely seen as being too
demanding, living in unsafe neighborhoods, or unable to pay as much as white couples.45
These stereotypes were shared by nannies of all races, including African-Americans and
Caribbeans.46 Similar phenomena have been used to explain the difficulties that African
American professionals have hailing cabs successfully – African American riders are
viewed as less safe passengers and poorer tippers.47 Waiters similarly perceive African
Americans as poor tippers, an expectation that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy if
African Americans receive less attentive service as a result.48 Even doctors seem to rely
on race-based statistical discrimination in diagnosing various ailments.49
There will be some contexts in which animus-based discrimination predominates
and others in which statistical discrimination predominates. In 2007, overt racial animus
persists but is probably waning as a result of generational replacement. A younger
generation of Americans has embraced Martin Luther King and feels embarrassed by
slavery, Jim Crow, and massive resistance to integration. To them, racial animus seems
distasteful and passé. That said, implicit bias, an unconscious form of animus-based
discrimination, is alive and well. Painting with broad brushstrokes, it appears that implicit
bias and statistical discrimination are more prevalent today than they were in prior eras,
and that overt animus-based discrimination is less prevalent.50
45
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To illustrate how statistical discrimination plays out in contemporary society,
suppose a person charged with hiring a sales clerk wants to avoid employing someone
with a criminal background. Assuming the decisionmaker lacks reliable access to
information about applicants’ criminal records, he might choose to hire a Caucasian
female over an equally qualified African American male, based on the relatively high
percentage of African American males and the relatively low percentage of Caucasian
females who are involved in the criminal justice system.51 This decisionmaking process
will impose a distasteful form of collective punishment on African American males who
have had no run-ins with the law, penalizing them for crimes that others have committed.
Because many decisionmakers may exercise the same decisionmaking criteria, a lawabiding African American male may face repeated rejection and economic
marginalization.52 For these reasons, antidiscrimination law prohibits the use of these
race or gender proxies even where race or gender might correlate with some relevant
qualification.53
Policing statistical discrimination through traditional antidiscrimination measures
has proven difficult: many victims of statistical discrimination never bring suit, many
non-victims bring unmeritorious suits that prompt defendants to settle so as to avoid the
costs of litigation, and enforcement of the laws by the Justice Department and state
attorneys general has been sporadic.54 Concerned about the courts being flooded with
frivolous claims, judges have imposed substantial burdens on plaintiffs seeking to enforce
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antidiscrimination laws, often hamstringing discovery, interpreting statutes of limitations
aggressively, or hastening resolution of claims on summary judgment.55
A fascinating recent paper in the Journal of Law and Economics by Holzer,
Raphael, and Stoll illustrates the prevalence of statistical discrimination and the failure of
antidiscrimination laws to curtail it.56 The paper began by noting that 28 percent of
African American males, 16 percent of Hispanic males, and 4 percent of white males
would be incarcerated at some point in their lives, and that the median prison sentence
was less than 2 years.57 As a result, Holzer and co-authors observed that a sizable
minority of the male labor pool in the United States consists of people with criminal
records.58 The study then surveyed employers about their most recent hire for a position
that did not require a college degree.59 The authors collected demographic information
about each firm’s most recent hire and information about the firm’s willingness to hire
employees with criminal records generally.
The findings of the study suggested that statistical discrimination against African
Americans males is widespread, and that employers were using race as a proxy for
involvement in the criminal justice system. Employers who conducted criminal
background checks on applicants were 8.4% more likely to hire African Americans than
employers who did not. Consistent with the statistical discrimination hypothesis, the
effect was highly significant for employers who expressed unwillingness to hire exoffenders (10.7% greater likelihood) and only marginally significant for employers who
stated their willingness to hire ex-offenders (4.8% greater likelihood.)60 The effects for
African American males were far greater than the effects for African American females,61
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which is consistent with the statistical discrimination hypothesis and harder to square
with a racial animus hypothesis. Further, the study found the same effects even after
controlling for differences in the racial composition of the applicant pool.62 The study
also found evidence that surveyed employers who do not conduct criminal background
checks used other proxies for criminal convictions as well, including spotty work history
and being unemployed for more than a year, and that those employers who expressed
unwillingness to hire ex-offenders were significantly less likely to hire members of these
stigmatized groups as well.63
Surveying their results, the study authors reached the following conclusion about
the effects of statistical discrimination on African American job applicants:
[T]he empirical estimates indicate that employers who perform criminal
background checks are more likely to hire black applicants than employers
that do not. . . . [T]his positive net effect indicates that the adverse
consequences of employer-initiated background checks on the likelihood
of hiring African Americans is more than offset by the positive effect of
eliminating statistical discrimination. . . .
In addition, we find that the positive effect of criminal background
checks on the likelihood that an employer hires a black applicant is larger
among firms that are unwilling to hire ex-offenders. This pattern is
consistent with the proposition that employers with a particularly strong
aversion to ex-offenders may be more likely to overestimate the
relationship between criminality and race and hence hire too few African
Americans as a result. . . .
The results of this study suggest that curtailing access to criminal
history records may actually harm more people than it helps and aggravate
racial differences in labor market outcomes.64
The implications of the study and of similar studies on the employment market,65 are
chilling, but they should not be surprising. Many employers wish to avoid hiring exoffenders because they consider them untrustworthy, because they are worried about
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vicarious liability, or for other reasons.66 Employers who expend resources on criminal
background checks will be able to sort effectively among those African Americans who
have had run-ins with law enforcement and those who have not, but other employers will
rely on race as a proxy for criminality, imposing a distasteful sanction on law-abiding
African American males.67
Given the deleterious consequences of this predictable behavior it is worth
examining the possible avenues, other than ex-post litigation, for the state to prevent
statistical discrimination. One way to protect African Americans and other disadvantaged
groups would be to make them appear indistinguishable from whites. Indeed, some
efforts to reform antidiscrimination law have suggested that statistical discrimination can
be mitigated if the relevant decisionmakers are deprived of information about a
candidates’ race, religion, or gender.68 With less information, decisionmakers presumably
will focus more on the black and white of a job applicant’s resume, and less on the black
or white of the applicant’s skin. Related efforts, such as the Racial Privacy Initiative that
was defeated at the polls in California in 2003, ostensibly sought to decrease racial
discrimination by prohibiting the government from collecting information about
individuals’ race, so that the government could not disseminate that information or act
upon it at a later date.69
In an era of ubiquitous personal information, we should consider approaching the
statistical discrimination problem from the opposite direction: using the government to
help provide decisionmakers with something that approximates complete information
66
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about each applicant, so that readily discernable facts like race or gender will not be
overemphasized and more obscure but relevant facts, like past job performance or social
capital, will loom larger. For instance, government subsidies could promote the creation
of employment evaluation clearinghouses, where individuals’ employment reviews from
all prior jobs would be aggregated in a single source that would be accessible to human
resources personnel. The government might further improve the quality of the data in
these clearinghouses by providing tax subsidies to encourage the collection of “360
degree” feedback within firms, a policy that is likely to decrease the weight associated
with any particular evaluation and minimize the likelihood that race- or gender- dynamics
will taint the accuracy of the employee evaluations.70 Further, the state could publish
information about all individuals’ involvement (or lack thereof) in the criminal justice or
bankruptcy systems; it might publish military records that document individuals’
performance and conduct while in the service; or it might verify and vouch for
applicant’s educational credentials.71
On this theory, a major factor driving unlawful discrimination on the basis of
race, ethnic status, gender, or religion is a lack of verifiable information about the
individual seeking a job, home, or service. By making the publication of criminal
histories tortious72 or raising the media’s costs of obtaining aggregated criminal history
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information that is already in the government’s hands,73 information privacy protections
become the enemy of antidiscrimination law. The tradeoff makes privacy law and
institutional arrangements that obscure information about individual’s reputations far
more problematic than courts and theorists presently suppose.
D.

Jury Selection

The same sorts of dynamics that confront decisionmakers in the hiring, leasing,
and sales contexts play out within the criminal justice system as well. The relatively few
high-stakes legal disputes that go to trial are often won or lost during the voir dire
process, when attorneys seek to seat the jurors deemed most sympathetic to the sorts of
arguments they will make and strike those deemed least sympathetic. Here, as in other
contexts, the relevant decisionmakers appear to rely heavily on characteristics that they
can discern at a relatively low cost – race, gender, age, and national origin.74 They also
rely on additional information that the jurors themselves provide, but there are significant
problems with taking that information at face value. First, the prospective jurors often
knowingly provide inaccurate information.75 Second, the jurors may be poor at selfassessing. For example, they may overestimate their ability to be impartial in light of
relevant life experiences. Third, there are lots of questions that attorneys would love to
know the answer to, but that they do not dare ask jurors. In some cases, lines of juror
questioning are placed off limits by the law, as is usually the case with prospective jurors’
voting records, medical conditions, or reading habits.76 In other instances, attorneys fear
antagonizing prospective jurors by asking them questions deemed overly intrusive.
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Attorneys have imperfect information about prospective jurors, and what
attorneys do not know about jurors may prove decisive in deliberations. Yet attorney
folklore about what observable characteristics affect juror decisionmaking is often
unreliable and unscientific.77 In recent years, a large industry of jury consultants has
sprung up, hoping to make jury selection less of an art and more of a science.78 The jury
consultant’s job is to take information that is available from jury questionnaires and voir
dire, and use it to predict a prospective juror’s behavior. Thus, jury consultants may try to
read body language, analyze handwriting, suggest revealing voir dire questions, or
provide lawyers with information about how members of various demographic groups
behave as jurors.79 To a jury consultant, the observable and trivial detail is often a proxy
for the unobservable and critical characteristic.80 But a large part of what modern jury
consultants now provide to their clients is even more fine-grained. Jury consultants
increasingly run background checks on the various prospective jurors in the pool, pulling
credit reports, employing search engines, looking for rap sheets, and examining property
tax records.81 In some cases, jury consultants work with private investigators who
photograph prospective jurors’ homes and vehicles, searching for any pertinent
information, like a political yard sign or a religious bumper sticker.82 What’s more, jury
surveillance is beginning to resemble a two-way street. Empanelled jurors are Googling
the attorneys who are making arguments before them with increasing regularity, and trial
lawyers are trying to make their web profiles as appealing as possible to these curious
jurors.83
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In what may be the beginning of an emerging trend, courts are examining the
backgrounds of jurors on their own initiative, rather than relying on the parties to do the
digging. Interest in this practice is particularly strong in Illinois, where the high-profile
corruption conviction of a former Governor was thought vulnerable on appeal thanks to
the dismissal of two jurors eight days into the deliberations.84 The jurors were dismissed
after Chicago Tribune reporters discovered that they had each concealed arrest records
during the jury selection process.85 To help prevent a repetition of these problems, the
Chief Judge of the Northern District of Illinois has instructed court personnel to conduct
criminal background checks on all prospective jurors in high profile cases.86 If the Illinois
experience proves successful, then one can imagine its duplication and expansion in other
jurisdictions.
What should we make of the Northern District’s reforms? Although criminal and
other background checks are increasingly relied upon by litigators in high-stakes trials,
not all parties employ them, and the George Ryan trial suggests that prosecutors
sometimes fail to do their homework on prospective jurors. In the case of criminal
records, the state is in the best position to aggregate the information and use it to remove
citizens with felony convictions from the jury pool ex ante, or provide the litigants with
this information as a matter of course, so that they can do with it what they want. Indeed,
the Ryan trial may be somewhat of an outlier in light of the many resources devoted to
the former Governor’s defense by a large Chicago law firm. In the typical criminal case,
prosecutors may have better access to criminal history databases than public or courtappointed defense counsel, and having the courts collect and disseminate this information
will prevent troubling asymmetries from arising in the criminal justice system. Thus, on
the whole, getting the courts more involved in collecting this information seems like a
good thing.
That said, we cannot evaluate the Northern District reform without some recourse
to first principles. We must decide whether the jury system is an effort to increase
84
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fairness in trials or merely another domain for lawyers to seek strategic and tactical
advantages over their adversaries. The Supreme Court has developed numerous doctrines
to police excesses in jury selection, most famously with the Batson limitations on the use
of peremptory challenges to strike racial minorities from juries.87
What is Batson about? Is it an attempt to make race a non-factor in the selection
of jurors? Is it about ensuring that juries resemble jury pools, which in turn reflect the
demographics of the citizenry as a whole? Does it apply to demographic factors besides
race?88 Is it about ensuring that criminal defendants receive trials that are deemed
legitimate and fair? Do Batson rights protect prosecutors and civil litigants, as well?89 Or
does Batson protect prospective jurors’ rights against mistreatment on account of race?
The answers to these questions are important, because they can help us evaluate the
growing reliance on external sources of information about prospective jurors. In postBatson cases, the Supreme Court has implied that all these interests are furthered by
Batson.90 At the same time, by grounding its analysis in the Equal Protection Clause, and
focusing on the harm to prospective jurors, the Court has suggested that a constitutional
violation may have occurred even if the ultimate jury verdict was not affected by the
unlawful use of peremptory challenges.91
If making race a non-factor in jury selection is Batson’s primary objective, as a
mechanism for protecting the rights of either litigants or prospective jurors, then it is
quite clear that Batson and its progeny have not achieved this goal.92 Batson can be
evaded by the lawyer who strikes some prospective jurors on the basis of race, so long as
not “too many” prospective jurors are stricken on that basis. Alternatively, the lawyer
might successfully articulate a non-race-based rationale, such as a prospective juror’s
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demeanor,93 for striking a disproportionate number of racial group members. This is not
difficult to do – recent experimental evidence suggests that college students and attorneys
alike instinctively identify non-race-based rationales for decisions that were driven by a
prospective juror’s race.94 To make race a non-factor, much stronger medicine than
Batson would be required. Namely, attorneys should not be able to see prospective jurors
during voir dire, but would be limited to examining jurors behind an opaque screen (as in
The Dating Game or an orchestral audition). Moreover, attorneys should be denied access
to prospective jurors’ names and addresses, which often indicate racial background with
substantial reliability and enable snooping attorneys to obtain a wealth of information
about the jurors from third parties. The court might have to disguise prospective jurors’
voices and colloquialisms as well. This would be a plausible way of conducting jury
selection, and it may be optimal as a means of curtailing troubling, exclusionary
practices, albeit at significant cost.95
At the other extreme, the law might address the problem of racially exclusionary
uses of peremptory strikes by providing more information, not less. On this score, the
Northern District policy is merely a baby step in the right direction. The government
could report to the parties juror credit scores, military service records, bankruptcy filings,
and involvement in prior litigation. It could review mental health records in the state’s
possession to screen out those who might be unfit for service. It could scour public
records and conduct Lexis-Nexis searches to provide the parties with any relevant
information.
If the government did all these things, essentially providing dossiers on all
prospective jurors, one might expect to see less discrimination on the basis of race,
93
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national origin, religion, gender, and other immutable characteristics. Indeed, a regime of
full and symmetrical disclosure of juror profile information to the litigants conceivably
could do more to combat the improper use of race as a proxy than Batson ever has.
Alas, there is an important complication here, suggesting that such a regime may
be more appealing in the employment context than in the jury context. The available
empirical evidence suggests that race is itself a strong predictor of whether a juror will
initially vote to impose the death penalty in a capital case, with whites twice as likely as
blacks to vote for the death sentence.96 Socioeconomic status, by contrast, had no effect
on initial votes by jurors.97 A capable defense lawyer thus might not be using race as a
proxy for anything other than a juror’s propensity to send his client to death row. Indeed,
black and white jurors appear to behave differently in a number of respects, such as their
certainty that a defendant is guilty, their perceptions of the defendant’s remorse, and their
assessments of the defendant’s future dangerousness.98 These behavioral tendencies
evidently alter outcomes in capital jury sentences, with counties that have large African
American populations imposing the death penalty at lower rates than counties with
smaller African American populations.99 Some less careful survey evidence suggests that
race is an equally important predictive factor in civil trials, swamping the effects of
income, gender, and political inclinations.100 In civil cases, African Americans appear to
be markedly more sympathetic to plaintiffs than Caucasians, at both the liability and
damages phases.101
Maybe in the jury context, race is an unusually valuable proxy for propensity to
convict or impose liability on a defendant. If African American and Anglo jurors
approach legal controversies in fundamentally different ways because of their radically
divergent interactions with police officers, or large employers, banks, insurers, and other
96
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institutional defendants,102 then providing litigants with more information about all
prospective jurors may do little to stem prosecutor and defense counsel’s reliance on race
in voir dire. But if that is the case, it raises the question of whether the Batson doctrine is
even a sensible one, or whether Batson ought to be replaced instead with affirmative rules
mandating that each empanelled jury roughly reflect the racial diversity of the jury pool.
Another factor should temper our embrace of pervasive reputation information in
the voir dire context. Jury duty is already viewed as an unappetizing prospect for many
Americans, and the loss of privacy associated with comprehensive government
background checks could prompt stiff resistance and exacerbate juror absenteeism. To be
sure, a savvy juror appreciates the possibility that litigants will gather information about
her already, but Americans often feel more dread about governmental possession of
private information than they do upon realizing that such information has been obtained
by nongovernmental actions.103 Even more important, the loss of privacy associated with
submitting a job application or trying to find housing will not be sufficient to deter
reasonable people from the enterprise. Employment and housing are necessities, so we
can safely assume that the behavioral distortions associated with pervasive reputation
information will be minimal. Not so for jury duty. Jury duty is compulsory, but the
government cannot enforce its compulsory nature on the citizenry without incurring
substantial costs and generating significant resentment. Paradoxically, it may be the case
that it is necessary for the government to forego gathering a great deal of pertinent
information about prospective jurors to avoid diminishing the quality of the pool of
willing jurors.104
E.

Medical Diagnosis and Treatment

Employers’ use of statistical discrimination is troubling enough, as it endangers
peoples’ livelihoods. When doctors and other health professionals use the same strategies
for coping with incomplete information, it risks patients’ lives. Yet the health disparities
102
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literature suggests that doctors behave in much the same way that employers, trial
attorneys, and other decisionmakers do, with wrenching consequences for African
American patients.
Why would doctors use statistical discrimination in treating patients? One
possible explanation not well explored in the medical literature is that statistical
discrimination may be a strategy for staying out of prison. In recent years, state and
federal law enforcement officials have become more aggressive about tracking the
prescription of opioids by pursuing physicians who prescribe medication that is
subsequently diverted into the black market.105 Surveys of physicians show that many are
very concerned about prescribing narcotics to patients suffering from pain because of a
fear that such prescriptions will trigger drug enforcement agency investigations,106 with a
sizable minority of physicians admitting that they “give patients a limited supply of pain
medications to avoid being investigated” and a larger minority expressing concern that
“prescribing narcotics for patients with chronic pain is likely to trigger a drug
enforcement agency investigation.”107
Although one would hope that prosecutorial discretion will prevent prosecutions
of doctors who prescribed in good faith subsequently diverted narcotics, this fear of law
enforcement investigations is not misplaced. Surveys of prosecutors suggest that doctors
face a genuine risk of being charged with serious crimes, even if their decisions to
prescribe narcotics were medically defensible.108 And many jurisdictions track
physicians’ prescriptions of narcotics, forwarding copies of all filled prescriptions to law
enforcement personnel, a practice whose constitutionality the Supreme Court upheld in
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Whalen v. Roe.109 Successful prosecutions of physicians who were duped by their patients
into dispensing narcotics have garnered substantial media attention of late.110
When if a doctor risks incarceration if her patients divert prescribed medication to
the black market or abuse their medication, then it seems likely that she will try to sort
between those patients who are risky and those who are less risky. Race is a plausible
proxy here, and there is evidence suggesting that doctors use it in prescribing narcotics. A
survey of 397 patients being treated for chronic nonmalignant pain, and their primary
care physicians, found that although African American patients reported experiencing
more pain than Caucasian patients,111 Caucasians were significantly more likely to be
treated with stronger and longer-acting opioids.112 Even after the researchers controlled
for socioeconomic and other factors, Caucasians were more than twice as likely as
African Americans to be on opioids.113 Notably, there was no correlation between race
and the use of non-opioids pain drugs.114 What explained the racial disparity? Not
differential access to insurance or other payment options.115 And not divergent
preferences among African American and Caucasian patients.116 The study authors
concluded that the “more pronounced racial differences for strong and long-acting
opioids suggest that systematic mistrust, bias, or stereotyping phenomena could be in
play.”117
As with statistical discrimination in employment, there is a large literature to
suggest that doctors treat patients differently on the basis of race in a variety of settings.
Although fear of prosecution is a plausible explanation for statistical discrimination in the
109
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opioid prescription context, African American patients appear to receive worse treatment
in a variety of settings, even after controlling for socioeconomic factors.118 And this
worse treatment can be explained by physicians’ attitudes. A well-designed study by van
Ryn and Burke found that physicians view African Americans as more likely to abuse
medication and less likely to comply with doctors’ orders.119 These differences do not go
unnoticed by African American patients.120 Statistical discrimination on the basis of
socioeconomic status also has been observed in some settings – for example,
nephrologists are more likely to say they would refer a child of higher socioeconomic
status than lower socioeconomic status to a transplant doctor, with the likely explanation
being the belief that wealthier parents are more likely to ensure compliance with a
rigorous post-operative recovery regime.121
It would be tempting to say that these disparities could be eliminated by imposing
liability on physicians who engage in statistical discrimination, or by embracing efforts to
re-educate physicians to act in a colorblind manner. But scholars of health disparities
understand the inadequacies and dangers of such an approach.122 Just as employment
litigation and employer diversity training are incomplete remedies for discriminatory
hiring practices,123 they will be incomplete remedies in the prescription context. Balsa,
McGuire, and Meredith sensibly note that doctors’ “reliance on ‘priors’ related to age,
gender, or race, when low-cost reliable tests are available, is difficult to justify.”124 In the
treatment of pain, however, where existing diagnostic constraints often force doctors to
rely on a patients’ own statements and visible acts to discern the extent of a patient’s
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suffering, there are no low-cost reliable tests. But there are information-based strategies
that can reduce the appeal of statistical discrimination.
When doctors encounter patients who they believe are abusing prescription
medication, diverting medication to the black-market, overstating symptoms, or failing to
comply with protocols for taking medications or recuperating, they routinely include this
information in the patient’s medical records.125 If the contents of these medical records
were easily transferred from one physician to other physicians likely to encounter a
particular patient, then doctors would not need to engage in statistical discrimination on
the basis of race and other problematic proxies. The statistical discrimination problem, in
short, helps make a compelling case for the computerization of medical records, a process
that is proceeding at a snail’s pace in many parts of the country.126 A large literature
documents the costs of continued reliance on antiquated medical record-keeping.127
Diagnosis becomes more difficult. Patient choice’s of doctors are effectively constrained.
Tests and other procedures may be duplicated unnecessarily. This paper suggests that in
addition to all these problems, our failure to bring medical recordkeeping into the twentyfirst century may be contributing to distasteful discrimination, and that African American
patients are enduring unnecessary pain and inappropriate treatment as a consequence.
F.

Insurance

Earlier in this paper I identified statistical discrimination as a strategy that the law
prohibits. Yet it turns out that this is not always the case. Take insurance markets.
Insurers are generally prohibited from charging differential rates for insurance on the
basis of race.128 But some jurisdictions permit insurers to discriminate on the basis of
gender, for example, in the automobile and life insurance contexts.129 And many
jurisdictions permit insurers to use a customer’s zip code as a basis for premium setting,
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which is particularly controversial in light of the higher premiums that residents of
predominantly African American neighborhoods often pay.130
An important reason why insurers must rely on these forms of statistical
discrimination is the absence of reliable information about most drivers’ behavior. There
are a few terrible drivers who routinely get into accidents or incur speeding tickets, but
outside of these extremes, insurers have little information to go on. Information about
near misses, day-to-day aggressive driving, and other unsafe behavior is almost
nonexistent. As a result, the good driver who is involved in a fluke accident in which he
was not at fault will likely see his insurance premiums rise, a skilled and responsible
teenaged driver will pay extremely high premiums solely because of her age, and the
generally safe driver who is caught in a speed trap can expect to incur a substantial
insurance penalty.131
It need not be this way. As I have argued elsewhere,132 the government is capable
of generating a much more reliable and rich set of information about individual drivers’
observed behavior. All the government needs to do is mandate the participation of all
motorists in a “How’s My Driving?” program of the sort that have become nearly
ubiquitous for bus and commercial fleets. Doing so would generate an enormous amount
of additional information that would enable insurers to set premiums without having to
collectively sanction motorists who have the misfortune of being young, being male,
being unmarried, or living in predominantly African American neighborhoods.133
In the automobile insurance market, social insurance concerns don’t loom
particularly large. By mandating automobile insurance coverage, legislators are primarily
seeking to ensure that the victims of vehicular collisions will be compensated for their
injuries and losses. When jurisdictions mandate health insurance, as Massachusetts has
done, or provide health insurance, as the Medicare and Medicaid programs have done,

130

See Leah Wortham, The Economics of Insurance Classification: The Sound of One Invisible Hand
Clapping, 47 Ohio St. L.J. 835, 849 (1986). In recent years, some jurisdictions have pushed to curtail the
use of zip codes in premium setting. See R. John Street & Brandon G. Hummel, Recent Developments in
Insurance Regulation, 40 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 567, 592 (2005).
131
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “How’s My Driving?” for Everyone (And Everything?), 81 NYU L. REV. 1699,
1726-29 (2006).
132
Id.
133
Id.

36 of 82

they are acting on the basis of a somewhat different set of principles.134 Those principles
emphasize society’s interest in helping those who develop health complications as a
result of bad luck, bad genes, or even bad lifestyle choices. In short, insurance markets
are not monolithic, and government information policy may be a more useful policy tool
in those settings, like driving, where social insurance considerations do not loom
particularly large. But this argument about the benefits of making motorist behavior
information more widely available does not translate into an argument for widespread
availability of individuals’ genetic information.135
G.

Immigration Law

Throughout American history, policymakers have been using national origin
proxies to try to shape the nation’s workforce and polity. Most obviously, national origin
is a proxy for race, so Americans who cared about the racial composition of the United
States could use immigration policy as a tool for achieving their desired ends.136
Employers might use proxies in much the same way, seeking out immigrants from
particular nations because that nation’s inhabitants are believed to possess particular
characteristics.137
My colleagues, Adam Cox and Eric Posner, recently analyzed immigration design
decisions as a response to asymmetric information in the international migration
context.138 They suggested that the immigrant has private information about his own
attributes, preferences, and intentions that United States customs and immigration
officials lack. The government thus faces a decision between two sorts of strategies – it
can invest in gathering more information about prospective entrants before they are
admitted to the United States, or it can admit entrants freely, gather information about
134
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them when they are here, and then deport those whose actions in the United States
suggest that they will not be positive net contributors to society.139 Where the information
gathering and processing costs of assessing individuals’ likely contributions to society
based on their behavior abroad are high, we can expect to see the government rely more
on deportation. Where those costs are low, we can expect to see the government rely on
exclusion.
The United States is not alone in having undergone a reputation revolution in the
past decade or so. Other developed nations have also seen explosive growth in their data
broker industries,140 though the skeptical approach of European Union lawmakers toward
these developments have helped apply the brakes to this development somewhat.141 Of
course, while immigration to the United States from developed nations like Canada,
Japan, Germany, and Australia is not negligible, it pales in comparison to migration from
developing nations in which accurate consumer information databases do not exist.142
While it is no longer difficult to imagine the integration of cross-platform reputation
scores with wearable computers in this country, the ubiquity of such devices and data in
Ecuador or the Philippines seems a long way off, at best.
Yet it is precisely the absence of reliable information about individuals that causes
immigration officials to rely on proxies like national origin. In response to the events of
September 11, 2001, the United States substantially curtailed the number of visas issues
to residents of predominantly Islamic nations, and made it more difficult for foreigners to
study in the United States higher education system.143 (One of the terrorists involved in
the September 11 attacks was in the United States on a student visa).144 There were some
exceptions to this policy of national origin-based exclusion. In-demand specialists like
doctors, nurses, engineers, and academics had a somewhat easier time obtaining visas,145
139
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– in part because their skill sets were in particular demand, but in part because their
having obtained degrees in those fields suggested that it was unlikely that they would
present a threat to American national security.146 Wealthy foreigners with at least $1
million to invest in new American businesses also have a much easier time gaining
visas.147 Although this program was justified as an engine of job creation in the United
States,148 it might, alternatively, be characterized as another immigration proxy –
foreigners with disposable investment capital and a commitment to investing it in U.S.based startups might be particularly likely to be desirable migrants.149
Notice what is going on here – proxies are everywhere in immigration decisions.
National origin . . . Education . . . Career path . . . Age . . . Gender . . . English fluency . . .
Family ties in the United States . . . Wealth . . . All these attributes wind up determining
who is admitted to the United States and who is not. We rely on these proxies to indicate
who might pose a security risk, who might fill a technically or physically demanding job,
who might wind up on the welfare rolls and who might wind up starting a business, who
is likely to commit ordinary crimes, who might have a hard time finding employment in
the United States, who is likely to be assimilated, who is likely to return home when her
visa expires, and who is likely to overstay his visa.
It would, of course, be far simpler if immigration authorities could rely on
accurate information about individuals, rather than using these group-based proxies. But
there are serious impediments to such an approach – with individual-based information
scarce in the developing world, there may be little to augment reliance on crude proxies
like national origin or English fluency. And even as reputational information becomes
more readily available in the developing world, there will be serious questions about its
146
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reliability. Given the possibilities for a group, acting in concert, to create a falsely
positive reputation profile for one of their members, it would be an inappropriate leap of
faith to rely heavily on such information in deciding that someone poses a low threat to
national security.
This dichotomy suggests something counterintuitive, which is that the United
States ought not to embrace a one-size-fits-all methodology for evaluating visa
applicants. Rather, it should rely more heavily on individual-based-reputational
information when assessing immigrants from those countries with well developed
reputational infrastructures, and more heavily on proxies or post-entry surveillance and
deportation for visa seekers from nations where the reputational infrastructure is
nonexistent or of unreliable quality. The Japanese immigrant can be assessed rather
reliably prior to entry and then by-and-large ignored; the Mongolian immigrant might
need to be judged via proxies or admitted provisionally and subjected to greater
monitoring of his employment status and involvement in the criminal justice system by
immigration officials.
The foregoing analysis also sheds light on one of the most frustrating aspects of
U.S. immigration law. Political asylum appeals comprise a very significant percentage of
the docket in the federal appellate courts.150 In these cases, an applicant typically asserts
persecution on the basis of religion, political beliefs, or some other factor. Almost
invariably, the applicant comes from a nation where a distinct societal group is being
persecuted – immigrants from France and New Zealand have the good sense not to seek
asylum in the United States very often. Yet these asylum seekers also tend to come from
nations with poor private reputational infrastructures. To the extent that any entity in
these countries has a solid grasp of the attributes of individual citizens, it is the autocratic
government, and these government databases are not accessible to American immigration
officials. Genuine asylum seekers often flee without identification documents and other
forms of corroboration, or they may have their documents stolen in transit.151 As a result,
See, e.g., Lenni B. Benson, Symposium Introduction, 51 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 3, 5 (citing
statistics from the Second Circuit that 38% of all cases on the docket are asylum
petitions from the Bureau of Immigration Affairs, and that most of these are political
asylum cases).
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the asylum seeker typically has his own testimony, and little else in the way of proof to
support his application.152 U.S. law makes this testimony, standing alone, sufficient to
establish asylum eligibility.153
Yet there are many immigration judges who will be disinclined to grant asylum
applications for ideological reasons, and more immigration judges still who will be
skeptical that an asylum seeker is really just an economic immigrant or would be an
undesirable resident.154

With an absence of verified information about the asylum

seeker’s background and actions in his home country, the immigration judges often deny
asylum applications based on adverse credibility determinations. Because an immigration
judge is in the best position to assess an applicant’s credibility, appellate courts are
reluctant to reverse adverse credibility findings.155 The law does require, however, that
the immigration judge identify clear and cogent justifications for deeming an applicant’s
testimony incredible.156
As a result, asylum cases in the federal appellate courts often involve a particular
pattern. First, an immigration judge rejects an application on the basis of an adverse
credibility judgment. Second, inconsistencies in the applicant’s testimony form the basis
for that rejection. Third, appellate courts examine whether the purported inconsistencies
are legitimate, and warrant the adverse credibility judgment.157 To illustrate how this
pattern plays out, I will examine appellate cases from the Ninth and Second Circuits.
In Chebchoub v. INS,158 the Ninth Circuit considered the appeal of a Moroccan
who had been denied asylum in the United States. Chebchoub alleged that his brother,
Mustafa, was a leader of Movement Forward, a socialist opposition group.159 The
Moroccan government allegedly harassed, tortured, and imprisoned Chebchoub as a way
152
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of luring Mustafa out of hiding.160 He alleged that this behavior continued even after
Mustafa was expelled from Morocco and granted asylum in France, as the government
began to believe that Chebchoub himself was part of Movement Forward.161 Yet
inconsistencies in Chebchoub’s testimony tripped him up in proceedings before the
immigration judge. The judge cited “no less than 22 inconsistencies,” including
inconsistent testimony about “the events leading up to and surrounding his departure,”
and “discrepancies between his testimony and his affidavit regarding the number of times
he was arrested in the period prior to his departure.”162 The appellate court found these
inconsistencies to be a satisfactory basis for finding his testimony not credible.163
Notably, the appellate court then noted an additional basis for affirming the
immigration judge’s adverse credibility judgment – Chebchoub had produced no affidavit
from either Mustafa, who supposedly had been granted asylum in France, or anyone in
the United States who was involved in Movement Forward and could corroborate
Chebchoub’s involvement in that group.164 The court noted that it was too much to expect
Chebchoub to produce corroborating documentation from Morocco, whose government
would have no reason to cooperate with Chebchoub’s request, but getting “an affidavit
from a close relative living in Western Europe should have been a relatively
uncomplicated task that would not pose the type of particularized evidentiary burden that
would excuse corroboration.”165 In Chebchoub we see an appellate court sensibly
recognizing how the very different information environments of France and Morocco
ought to be reflected in varying burdens placed on asylum applicants seeking to extract
corroborating evidence from those locations.
The Second Circuit’s opinion in Guan v. INS provides some indication of the
difficulties that arise when an asylum seeker’s corroborating information is largely
located in a country with a relatively poor private information infrastructure. Guan, like
Chebchoub, involved an adverse credibility finding and a lack of corroborating evidence.
The petitioner in that case, Guan, a father of two, fled China because he feared forced
160
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sterilization for him or his wife under that country’s “One Child Policy.”166 The
immigration judge faulted Guan for presenting two marriage certificates with the same
photograph of himself and his wife – a curiosity because one marriage certificate was
issued in 1989 and the other was issued nine years later.167 The judge further noted a
discrepancy in the date of birth for Guan’s wife between her birth certificate and the xray of her tubal ligation.168 The judge also faulted the petitioner “for not producing
contemporaneous evidence of the births” of his children, and doubted the authenticity of
a doctor’s report concerning his wife’s tubal ligation.169 The judge then pointed to several
inconsistencies in Guan’s testimony concerning how he met the doctor who examined his
wife, and how long he had been in hiding before flying to the U.S.170 Finally, the judge
found Guan’s testimony incredible on the basis of his demeanor, as the judge noted that
Guan was hesitant, defensive under questioning about inconsistencies, and requested
“two or three water breaks during his testimony, which . . . appeared to have been used as
an opportunity to formulate a response when confronted with a conflicting
inconsistency.”171
The Second Circuit granted Guan’s petition for review, essentially reversing the
immigration judge’s decision. In dealing with the evidentiary issues, the court
admonished the immigration judge for assuming that Western assumptions about birth
certificate and marriage certificate documentation would prevail in China, with the court
insisting “that IJs’ standards for written corroboration must be calibrated to the norms
and practices of the aliens’ home countries, and the circumstances of the aliens’
departure.”172 But what of the demeanor evidence upon which the judge based his
adverse credibility finding? Here, the court noted that Guan had only requested water
once during his testimony, not two or three times as the immigration judge stated.173 The
appellate court thought that this math error was sufficient to reverse the adverse
credibility determination, and did not comment on the immigration judge’s findings of
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the petitioner’s defensiveness and hesitancy under cross-examination.174 The court
explained the remand by noting its lack of confidence that the immigration judge would
have reached the adverse credibility finding in the absence of this error.175
The Guan case illustrates the bizarre nature of asylum litigation in informationpoor environments. Immigration judges spend their time trying to find inconsistencies in
the petitioner’s testimony and documentary evidence so that they can order the petitioners
deported, and then appellate courts spend their time looking for inconsistencies between
the immigration judges’ opinions and the trial transcripts, so that they can reverse those
deportation orders. Add into the mix significant cultural misunderstandings, inaccurately
translated testimony, poorly compensated and often inept immigration attorneys
representing the petitioners, and it is little wonder that the immigration adjudication
system is so widely regarded as broken.176 There is a fundamental problem at the core of
this – the lack of accurate information about individuals – and in the coming decades as
information infrastructures improve in the developing world, we can hope that asylum
proceedings will be newly refocused on the relevant legal issues.
H.

Consumer Protection Law

Imagine an ordinary dispute between a consumer and a service provider. Say a
Citibank customer orders foreign currency to be delivered to his bank branch, and
Citibank promises to deliver the currency before the customer’s departure date, but the
currency does not arrive on time due to a bank error. As a result, the customer must incur
$100 in higher currency exchange fees abroad. The customer could demand a refund of
the extra fees from his bank, but if the bank refuses to pay up, the customer’s remedies
will not be particularly attractive.
The customer could sue the bank for breach of contract, perhaps in small claims
court or via an alternative dispute resolution mechanism that the customer may have
consented to at the time he opened the account. But the opportunity cost of filing suit or
pursuing arbitration will easily exceed any potential recovery. The customer could search
for similarly situated individuals in the hopes of assembling a class action, but even a
174
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successful lawsuit is likely to leave the plaintiffs’ lawyers as the primary beneficiaries. Or
perhaps the customer could complain to the Federal Reserve, which regulates Citibank.
An isolated complaint is likely to lead nowhere, but a flurry of similar complaints to the
Fed could prompt it to take action. None of these avenues seem particularly promising
methods of dealing with a garden-variety dispute.
Enter Epinions, the Better Business Bureau, and similar clearinghouses for
information about the behavior of companies. The disgruntled customer can post a review
of Citibank’s services on Epinions.com, a web site that presently includes 135 other
reviews of Citibank’s service – some favorable, and some unfavorable. Adding a 136th
review would contribute to a public good. There are several banking options for most
Americans, and consumers who are trying to decide which bank to choose will now have
the benefit of a richer, publicly available range of views. Such a posting might have
salutary effects on Citibank’s future behavior as well. At least in theory, Citibank should
try to improve its service so as to avoid further negative reviews that will scare away
potential customers.177 Epinions thus functions as a dispute discourager and potentially a
dispute resolution device.178 In a case like the one I just described it is likely the best way
of addressing a dispute.
We now encounter a puzzle. The state subsidizes the courts to a very significant
degree. If I choose to pursue this case in small claims court, state court, or any other
tribunal, the state will pay the salary of the judges, law clerks, and administrative
personnel who will help resolve the matter. If, on the other hand, I choose what is in this
case the more efficient route, and the more sensible route of lodging a complaint on
Epinions, the state subsidy will disappear. On the margins, then, the state is shifting
individuals from what will sometimes be the more efficient dispute resolution forum
toward the least efficient dispute resolution forum.179

177

For a description of how Tripadvisor.com has played this role in the hotel industry, see Michelle
Higgins, The Web Gives Hotel Guests the Last Word, N.Y. Times, April 8, 2007, at 56.
178
For an analysis of similar online dispute resolution mechanisms, see Pablo Cortes, The Potential of
Online Dispute Resolution as a Consumer Redress Mechanism (Working Draft July 6, 2007), available at
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=998865>.
179
This is a point made eloquently in a recent law review article, which argued that the government subsidy
for courts weakens the private market for alternative dispute resolution. See Arthur B. Pearlstein, The
Justice Bazaar: Dispute Resolution through Emergent Private Ordering as a Superior Alternative to
Authoritarian Court Bureaucracy, 22 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 739, 783-88 (2007). In a somewhat

45 of 82

There is an argument, of course, that the state achieves particular public goods
whenever litigation occurs. Namely, litigation creates precedents, and precedents guide
third parties in their efforts to understand what the law requires of them.180 But litigation
is not the only mechanism for achieving positive externalities arising out of dispute
resolution. Recall our Citibank complaint. In articulating a grievance about Citibank a
customer has both encouraged that corporation to respond to the substance of his
complaints, and made the interested public aware of one data point that reflects on the
company’s customer service. This is not the same sort of public externality as the value
of precedent – because it lacks a resolution of the case by a neutral third party it is more
akin to the public benefits that would arise if all legal briefs were made public. Would it
be more useful for the public to have, readily available, copies of all the complaints filed
against a company, and the company’s responses to those complaints, or would it be
more useful for the public to have one judicial opinion resolving one of those disputes?
The answer is not clear.
Another potential positive externality resulting from litigation is the potential for
the judgment to defuse a controversy that might otherwise escalate. When the courts
resolve an issue, it reduces the probability that the parties will resort to violent self help
to settle a dispute, and that violence could harm both the parties to the dispute and
innocent third parties who get caught in the crossfire. Here again, though, it is by no
means clear that court adjudication or administrative action is superior to negative
feedback as a mechanism for defusing heated disputes. There is a large psychological
literature suggesting that aggrieved individuals feel much better after posting a complaint
about another’s misconduct, even if the source of the complaint takes no subsequent
remedial action.181 Written venting, simply put, has great psychological value. It provides
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a release for the frustrated consumer.182 It enables a consumer to warn other customers
about a merchant’s misbehavior.183 And it raises the likelihood that the merchant will
take measures to try to improve the consumer’s experience.184 The process of recalling,
describing, and making sense of a negative experience seems to make it easier for
consumers to forget those negative experiences and the accompanying angst.185
Services like Epinions, the Better Business Bureau, Angie’s List, and similar
forums are far less expensive to use than administrative bureaucracies or courts. If the
target of a complaint is a well-run business, it might well learn how to improve its service
based on complaints lodged186 and, particularly if it wants to remain in good standing
with the Better Business Bureau, remedy any wrongs it perpetrated. Customers who have
their problems addressed successfully are not quite as happy as customers who never
have any problems to begin with, but they are significantly happier than customers whose
complaints went unheard.187
The more information becomes available about individuals, the more valuable
resources like Epinions become to their users. Epinions attempts to capture this
functionality by flagging the reviews of particularly prolific or helpful reviewers. Netflix
recently rolled out an even better functionality. Netflix uses an algorithm to categorize its
users based on their film ratings, and generate similarity scores. If I want to decide
whether I should rent, say Genghis Blues, a documentary that was recently at the top of
my Netflix queue, I can click on that movie, and see the written reviews of other Netflix
users, compared with a score revealing the similarity of their movie rankings to my own.
Netflix user Jamie W didn’t like the movie, giving it only two stars, and Netflix says
Jamie’s tastes are 63% similar to my own. User BW 57226 loved it, giving it five stars,
but Netflix says that BW’s tastes are only 41% similar to my own, so maybe I should be
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skeptical. If I want to explore this further, I can read the contents of Jamie W’s review
and BW 57226’s review, to see whose reasons for not liking or liking the film seem more
pertinent, and Netflix lets me see all their other movie reviews too, so that I can see their
substantive comments about movies I have seen, and decide whether I am likely to share
their concerns.
These sorts of innovations have applications well beyond movie ratings. Imagine
if every plumber, every manufactured product, every cell phone provider, every home
builder, every tour guide, every hair stylist, every accountant, every attorney, every golf
pro, every professor, and every taxi driver was rated in the same way, with both the
detailed written reviews and summary statistics that Netflix currently provides. In such a
world, there would be a diminished need for an FTC or deputy state attorneys general,
because consumers would police misconduct themselves. In such a world, fewer disputes
would wind up in court because unscrupulous or inept merchants or service providers
would have a much harder time finding customers.188 Though the technology for these
resources already exists, and in some cases (e.g., Avvo.com for rating lawyers or
ratemyprofessor.com for academics or angieslist.com for plumbers), those services have
been launched. That said, these web services lack the large data sets that help keep
Netflix ratings accurate. Though Netflix customers are quite willing to write reviews of
movies, plumber customers are a bit more reluctant. And while ratemyprofessors.com
sports a handful of student reviews of professors, universities and colleges do not import
the much richer data collected from official end-of-the-semester evaluations into those
databases. Because there is a dearth of reviews at these web sites, there is an insufficient
incentive for consumers to consult them before hiring a service provider or enrolling in a
class.
These problems suggest the appeal of subsidizing consumer-oriented ratings web
sites and other low-cost mechanisms for dispute resolution and avoidance. Such subsidies
could benefit such services on both the supply and demand sides – providing discounts
for customers who provide detailed evaluations of merchants and service providers, and
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facilitating access to these databases by individuals whose access to the Internet is limited
because of economic, educational, or linguistic impediments.
There is much that government can do in-kind, to help these resources along as
well. In many instances, the government will have information about a merchant or
service provider’s performance that members of the public might lack. For example, only
the government, and the inspected restaurateur, know the contents of public health
inspections in many jurisdictions.189 But there is no reason why this information should
not be posted to restaurant-rating web sites as soon as it becomes available. Similarly, the
government may have information about criminal proceedings brought against
accountants, state bar disciplinary proceedings brought against attorneys, or APAgenerated public commentary generated by license renewal requests for radio frequency
broadcasters. Again, it would be a relatively simple task to aggregate the information that
is already in the government’s hands and use it to supplement existing privately run
rating resources. Yet in many circumstances, the information is actually suppressed by
the government.190

II.

When to Use Information Policy?
The preceding discussion suggests that the widespread availability of information

about individuals and firms ought to alter the way we think about law and public policy
in a variety of domains. In some settings, such as the employment context, disclosing
previously private information about individuals may prove to be a desirable government
intervention. In other settings, such as the juror selection process, there is a stronger
argument for maintaining the privacy of information about individuals. This part provides
a new typology of government information policies and draws some general lessons from
the tour through many legal subject matters.
A.

Of Carrots, Sticks, Curtains, and Search Lights

We lawyers are conditioned to think about using law to create private incentives
through two well-known tools: Carrots and sticks. The carrot approach rewards desirable
189
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private behavior (perhaps through tax incentives, subsidies, or positive recognition), and
the stick approach punishes undesirable behavior (via criminal fines, civil liability, or the
use of the bully pulpit). Upon reflection, however, carrots and sticks are not all there is.
We are also familiar with curtains. Government can try to make potentially observable
characteristics obscure, so as to make it more difficult for private decisionmakers to act
on the basis of observable characteristics. This is what legislators do when they attempt
to restrict genetic discrimination, it is what progressive reformers attempted to do when
they created non-partisan elections, thereby preventing voters from electing judges or
mayors on the basis of party affiliations, and various doctrines limiting the sorts of
information that attorneys can collect about prospective jurors follow the same tack.
These “curtain” strategies have been advocated in the antidiscrimination context
as well. Indeed, some efforts to reform antidiscrimination law have suggested that
statistical discrimination can be mitigated if the relevant decisionmakers are deprived of
information about a candidates’ race, religion, or gender.

191

With less information,

decisionmakers presumably will focus more on a job applicant’s qualifications, and less
on the applicant’s skin pigment.
Search lights are less familiar than curtains, but this paper has suggested that they
provide a fourth policy alternative. The state can make private discrimination on the basis
of illegitimate or misleading observable characteristics less appealing by making
legitimate or informative characteristics more easily observable. This is what the
government does when it mandates the placement of visible signs rating the hygiene of
each Los Angeles restaurant outside that establishment’s front door based on public
health inspections, a policy that has significantly reduced hospitalizations from foodrelated illnesses, increased revenues for restaurants sporting high hygiene grades, and
reduced revenues for restaurants that must advertise their barely passing grades.192 This is
what the government does when it publishes information about the identities of those
with criminal histories. And this is the basic strategy behind mandatory S.E.C.
disclosures in corporate law.
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Note that the framework described here eschews any act-omission distinction.
Just as we can equate the absence of a carrot with a stick, at least in the presence of many
other carrots, we can understand the absence of a government search light as equivalent
to a curtain. In some settings, the law will reduce the observability of individual attributes
through affirmative acts (like privacy tort protections), and in other settings, it will reduce
the observability of individual attributes via omissions (like antiquated and obsolete
public information dissemination strategies).193 An information asymmetry might result
just as easily from an affirmative government act as a failure to act. To the extent that
there are relevant differences between these acts and omissions, they would stem from
their differing social meaning.
This paper’s most generalizable insight concerns the importance of search lights
and their potential to address a large number of social ills. This search light strategy will
not always be the optimal one, just as carrots, sticks, and curtains may fail us at times.
But we can do more with four tools than we can with three, and this part will identify
those settings in which search light strategies are well-suited or poorly suited.
B.
Where

Animus Based Discriminators and Pretext
statistical

discrimination

is

more

prevalent

than

animus-based

discrimination, policymakers should rely on search light strategies. Where animus-based
discrimination is more prevalent, curtain strategies will be appropriate. The reason why is
rather straightforward: It is easy for animus-based discriminators to identify a pretextual
reason for rejecting an applicant when they have lots of information about the applicant,
and harder for the discriminator to point to a legitimate non-discriminatory basis for an
adverse decision when the decisionmaker lacks information about the candidate. For
example, suppose that an employer dislikes African Americans and refuses to hire a wellqualified African American applicant on the basis of the applicant’s race. If the employer
has access to information about the applicant’s credit history, social relations, academic
record, prior employment evaluations, and the like, then it will be relatively easy for the
employer to falsely claim that information contained in those resources explained the
decision not to hire the applicant. No applicant is perfect, after all. By contrast, if all the
193
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employer knows about the applicant is his skin color, then it will be impossible for the
employer to identify a neutral justification for the refusal to hire. In short, given imperfect
information about decisionmakers’ true motives, the search light strategy will backfire
when it is used to provide an animus-based discriminator with additional information.
In the jury selection context, query whether the motivations of the parties seeking
to strike a juror of a particular race from a panel matter. If Batson is designed to address
an injury to prospective jurors, it would seem as though the prosecutor who strikes
African Americans from the panel because he hates African Americans is more
dangerous than the prosecutor who strikes African Americans from the panel because he
believes that doing so is more likely to result in the conviction of the African American
defendant.194 But while there are indications in the case law that Batson is designed to
protect jurors,195 the doctrine is invoked by litigants, and these litigants have no incentive
to make the inflammatory argument that the other side is motivated by something other
than a desire to maximize their odds of winning at trial. In any event, the analysis here
suggests an inadequacy of Batson’s effective treatment of all litigants as statistical
discriminators. The search light strategy will only reduce reliance on the prospective
jurors’ race if the litigant whose actions are challenged is engaged in rational, statistical
discrimination.
C.

False Information

Accurate information is a necessary ingredient of any effort to combat statistical
discrimination via government information policy. Some of the information discussed
herein – military records, records of criminal convictions, bankruptcy records,
immigration and naturalization documents, and the like – will not pose serious accuracy
problems. To the extent that errors occur, they will often resolve around cases of
mistaken identity, where someone sharing the same name as another person with an
undesirable characteristic is thereby penalized.196 These problems can be ameliorated
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through the use of supplemental identifiers, such as birthdates, birth places, and partial
Social Security Numbers.
A more daunting challenge arises in the context of identity theft. If a bad actor
successfully hijacks the identity of a good actor, and then uses the good actor’s identity to
defraud unsuspecting consumers, significant damage can result. The consumers will be
misled. The good actor’s reputation will be trashed unfairly. And confidence in the
reputation system as a whole will be eroded. But here is the rub: reliance on search light
strategies might facilitate identity theft, because private information is often used for
identity authentication purposes.
The logical response is to discourage reliance on personal history information for
authentication purposes. A regime that widely publicizes consumers’ birthdates is a
regime in which any bank or credit card company would be foolhardy using birthdates as
a basis for authentication. The costs of transitioning away from biographical information
toward password-based authentication and biometrics will not be significant. But nor will
they be zero. Because identity theft represents such a significant threat to reputationreliant dispute avoidance and resolution strategies, these are minor tweaks to business
practices that need to be made. The more daunting false information problems arise in the
context of data that is not contained in existing public records, but rather is the product of
government efforts to facilitate wider availability of information about individuals.
Nobody believes that the inaccurate feedback problem can be solved entirely in
reputation-tracking environments. For example, if the government does try to improve
the efficiency of the labor market by subsidizing the collection of 360 degree feedback
and making that feedback transportable across firms, then it will have to deal with
deliberately or unintentionally false feedback that employee A provides about employee
B. Critically, if an employer relies heavily on co-worker evaluations in deciding not to
hire a seemingly qualified applicant, but those evaluations are themselves the product of
co-worker animus or implicit bias, then the government strategy might be
counterproductive.197 But, as I have explained at length elsewhere, there are strong
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reasons to believe that the problems can be ameliorated significantly through the use of
algorithms designed to locate outlier data points, along with spot-checks and audits
relying on objective verification.198 Given enough information, these algorithms can
identify instances where an individual provides suspiciously high levels of negative
feedback toward members of an identifiable racial or gender group. Once identified, the
system can then adjust the weight assigned to such feedback, substantially offsetting the
harm done by feedback that is likely tainted by animus or implicit bias.
It is sometimes tempting to use the imperfections in feedback systems as a basis
for rejecting their use. But the appropriate contrast is not between a world of perfectly
accurate information about individuals and the sometimes flawed information that can be
generated by an eBay-style reputation tracking mechanism. There are daunting false
feedback equivalents in the real world. A poor man buys one expensive suit to appear
prosperous. A debt-saddled person drives a very nice car or eats at really nice restaurants
to appear well off. A middle aged person has plastic surgery to appear young. A person of
average intelligence wears geek chic glasses to appear smarter. An individual fakes an
accent to appear worldly. A would-be adulterer removes a wedding ring to appear
unmarried. Reputation tracking systems like eBay’s, Slashdot’s, Tripadvisor’s, and
Digg’s introduce some false feedback, but because most feedback providers are sincere,
and algorithms can help the purveyors or users of these sites weigh more heavily the
feedback provided by reviewers who have proven their reliability, their signal to noise
ratios are often quite high.
There will be contexts in which disseminating feedback information from
consumers may not be appropriate. Some aspects of the doctor-patient relationship seem
to fall into this category. Patients are quite capable of assessing physicians’ bedside
manner, their ability to communicate, their promptness and the like. But in many cases,
patients will do a poor job assessing physicians’ diagnostic skills, their surgical
techniques, or the accuracy of their prognoses – at least in the short run. There will be
selection effects that make the assessments more difficult to evaluate too, though
feedback can be normalized statistically based on the vagaries of a physician’s patient
population. More troublingly, if patients are rating physicians and physicians are rating
198
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patients publicly, then there will be a strong incentive for physicians and patients to trade
unduly favorable feedback with each other. This “Pollyanna effect” dynamic has played
out on eBay, with the result being that eBay feedback is more favorable than it ought to
be.199 Given the strong interests, identified above, in having physicians provide accurate,
albeit perhaps unflattering assessments of their patients in their medical records, the
appropriate regime might (a) make physician assessments of patients available only to
other physicians in the absence of a court order, or (b) prohibit patients from assessing
certain physician characteristics, or (c) impose a time lag, whereby patients could only
assess physician characteristics after some period of time.
D.

Too Much Reputation

A strong reputation merely correlates with desirable attributes. It is not a perfect
proxy for those attributes. As a result, there is a lingering danger that increased reliance
on individuals’ reputations for sorting purposes will prompt individuals or firms to overinvest in actions that will improve their reputations.200 For example, a professor might
pander to his students by providing them with free baked goods on the last day of class,
not coincidentally the same day that the students will fill out teaching evaluations. Or,
worse yet, the professor may try to entertain the students at the expense of teaching them.
Alternatively, a hotel might provide monetary incentives for its customers to provide
favorable reviews, rather than making capital expenditures that will improve the hotel’s
amenities or devoting more money to salary, so that more skilled workers will seek
employment there.201
Though they may boost feedback ratings,202 these sorts of activities represent
wasteful investments, and they also have the potential to degrade the quality of a
reputation-rating resource. For the latter reason, ratings web sites have devoted
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substantial resources to trying to sanction firms that employ these tactics.203 The teaching
evaluation context is easier to monitor. While some students will reward a teacher who
gives away cookies on the last day of class with stronger evaluations, other students are
likely to resent the pandering, and note their disapproval of the tactic on their anonymous
student evaluation forms. If a professor’s colleagues discover this whistle-blowing, then
the significance of the professor’s generally positive evaluations will be discounted, and
the baked-goods-dispensing professor will be subjected to negative peer pressure by
colleagues who would prefer to avoid making wasteful expenditures and have an interest
in preventing student evaluations from becoming a noisy indicator of teaching quality. In
short, as long as there are sufficiently large numbers of raters, some heterogeneity in
attitudes regarding the appropriateness of expenditures designed to enhance reputation
but not service quality, an a reluctance on the part of feedback providers to lodge false
accusations of pandering, there is an effective corrective whistle-blowing mechanism that
will deter excessive investments in reputation.
More generally, it is useful to examine the ex ante effects of ubiquitous personal
information. There are obvious upsides and downsides to such a regime. If we are dealing
with everyday interactions among people, then it seems likely that the ex ante effects will
be quite positive.204 That might be one take-away point from Bob Ellickson’s extended
case study of Shasta County, California – where a well functioning gossip network
facilitated the formation and enforcement of a seemingly wealth maximizing set of social
norms.205 It is also a fair take-away from my own analysis of motorist behavior, where
the practical anonymity of drivers vis-à-vis one another seemed to encourage antisocial
driving.206 But in other contexts, the ex ante effects of reputation monitoring will be
undesirable. For example, a ubiquitous feedback mechanism might discourage
individuals from expressing unpopular opinions about political issues, lest they be given
negative feedback by scores of median voters.207 Alternatively, having their every move
watched and profiled might discourage socially beneficial forms of identity
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experimentation.208 Broadly speaking, then, the use of ubiquitous personal information
and feedback will be most desirable when majoritarian norms are particularly
unproblematic.
This discussion brings a related point to the forefront, which is that as
mechanisms for tracking personal information improve, investments in some sorts of
signaling can be expected to decline. Signaling occurs when an individual makes a costly
expenditure or takes a costly action so as to increase the likelihood that others will trust
her or want to pursue economic or social relationships with her.209 Classic examples of
signaling behavior include conspicuous consumption of luxury items or branded goods,
foregoing a pre-nuptial agreement as a means of signaling love prior to a marriage, nonanonymous contributions to cultural charities, or choosing to attending a university
because of its selective admissions process.210 Although no one has tried to estimate the
costs associated with signaling, signaling is plausibly one of the largest sources of waste
in modern economies. People rely on signals when they lack more precise and reliable
indicators of an individual’s attributes. By making such information more readily
available, the law could substantially decrease the incentives for individuals to devote
significant resources to signaling.211
E.

Kings in Disguise

King Abdullah of Jordan is famous for donning various disguises and mingling
with his subjects to get a better sense of what life is like for ordinary Jordanians.212 The
incognito king has waited in lines at government tax offices, observed traffic regulation
from behind the wheel of a taxi, and posed as a television journalist to get a sense of life
in Jordan’s free trade zone. Media accounts of the King’s disguised exploits are usually
laudatory, suggesting that the experiences enable the monarch to avoid getting an unduly
rosy account of life in his country.
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While the King of Jordan is not walking around the average American city, it is
possible that disguised reputations help keep our government officials in line as well.
Take instances of policy brutality in major American cities. When scandals about rough
treatment emerge, it is often because the police roughed up a prominent minister or
elected official who is a member of a minority group.213 By seeing the way in which a
prominent, powerful, and law-abiding African American is treated, the public may learn
about how their less prominent and powerful but nevertheless law-abiding peers are
routinely treated. Similarly, to some readers, the story of Oprah and her entourage in
Paris was newsworthy because it suggested the persistence of racism in French society.214
On this account, Akerlof’s famous “lemons problem” becomes a “lemons solution” of
sorts.215 It is therefore worth asking whether a world with ubiquitous reputation
information is one in which disturbing instances of unequal treatment get swept under the
rug.
Should we tolerate some extra brutality in the hopes that outrage over this
brutality will raise public consternation and ultimately reduce the incidence of police
brutality? That seems like a perilous strategy.216 I do not doubt that the possibility that an
African American motorist might be a well-known minister or city councilman constrains
the behavior of police officers somewhat. But there are significant advantages that offset
this loss. A police officer pulling over an African American motorist in an economically
depressed community might feel few constraints on his behavior until he learned that the
motorist is the nephew of a well-known minister, a receptionist who answers phones in a
prominent city councilman’s office, or the uncle of another officer on the same police
force. Few citizens are celebrities but a lot of people are connected to people with clout.
If officers approach motorists or pedestrians in a depressed area thinking that anyone who
isn’t a celebrity is part of an undifferentiated mass, then the King Abdullah effect may do
213
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little to keep them honest. There is a tradeoff here, but it is probably one society ought to
be willing to make. If, as seems plausible, police officers usually underestimate the
likelihood that a profiled individual is connected to someone with clout, then less
anonymity for citizens probably will be a net positive.
F.

Who Is the Appropriate Information Provider?

In many instances, the government has the best access to information that
decisionmakers will want to use. Criminal records, bankruptcy records, military service
records, immigration and naturalization records, academic records from public schools or
state-run universities, or records regarding membership in licensed professions are
obvious examples.217 In other instances, valuable information will be generated by
private parties, and the government might face political or agency constraints that prevent
it from generating equally accurate information. For example, there is little reason to urge
the government’s involvement in the generation of consumer credit scores. Although
Experian and the other credit scoring agencies sometimes make mistakes, their incentives
are properly aligned, and they are insulated from interest group pressure regarding the
formula used for credit scores. Similarly, the government should not get into the business
of running social networking sites or developing auction web sites as a mechanism for
combating statistical discrimination. There are market actors with substantial comparative
advantages over the government, and they are already doing a fine job of making new
information available to the public.218 In these settings, the government’s role should be
confined to facilitating the adoption of uniform standards (e.g., through subsidies), so that
information can be aggregated easily from among a number of different social
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networking web sites and reputations can be transportable from one auction site to
another.
In perhaps the majority of instances, the most appropriate role that the state can
play in facilitating the development of a robust reputational market is to get out of the
way. Take an illustrative example. In July of this year, Avvo.com, a new web site that
rates lawyers, was launched. The web site aspired to do for attorneys what Zagat did for
restaurants – provide consumers with information that they could use to find a suitable
lawyer, and collect evaluations of lawyers from fellow attorneys and clients.219 Alas,
within ten days of its launch, Avvo was sued in a class action lawsuit by attorneys
alleging that Avvo had violated Washington State’s Consumer Protection Act by
disseminating unfair and deceptive information about lawyers who were rated by the
site.220 More precisely, the complaint faulted Avvo’s web site for being subjective,
unreliable, providing questionably low numerical ratings to Supreme Court justices, law
school deans, and other highly regarded lawyers, using a non-transparent methodology
for developing lawyer ratings, and providing incomplete information.221 The suit’s lead
plaintiff, Browne, was an attorney who claimed to have lost two clients as a result of a
low Avvo rating, a rating that was tied to a state bar disciplinary proceeding against him,
which had resulted in an admonition.222
Avvo moved for dismissal in short order, arguing that its services were protected
by the First Amendment, that they were immune from liability under section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, and that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under the
state’s Consumer Protection Act.223 If Avvo is liable for its conduct, then it seems likely
that Zagat may be liable to Pizza Hut if unfavorable restaurant reviews result in a poor
rating; U.S. News & World Report may be liable to Florida Coastal School of Law for
placing that law school in the fourth tier, and eBay may be liable to vendors who cannot
219
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make sales because they have poor feedback ratings. The federal courts hopefully will
recognize the untenable nature of all these results.
In many contexts, the appropriate legal regime may well be the one dictated by
section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (C.D.A.). Under that provision
providers of interactive computer services cannot be held liable for publishing
“information provided by another information content provider.”224 But the numerical
ratings produced by Avvo would not seem to fall under this provision of the Act. Avvo
could likely avoid liability by invoking the First Amendment’s protections for publishing
opinions, and they have quite sensibly invoked this doctrine in their pleadings.225 Still,
one cannot help wondering about the appropriateness of forcing Avvo to resolve their
dispute with Browne in a legal forum at all. If Browne does not like his rating, and is
thereby harmed, is a class action lawsuit really the appropriate way of addressing that
grievance?
Under these circumstances, there are superior alternatives. Namely, individuals
like Browne who believe that false information has been disseminated about them ought
to have a right of reply – an ability to explain why they believe they have received
inappropriate ratings from a web site or a complaining consumer.226 This right of reply is
something that is already built into eBay’s and Tripadvisor’s feedback systems, and users
of eBay or Tripadvisor vendors typically employ it where they believe they have unfairly
received negative feedback. An attorney like Browne could make use of his right of reply
to note that other lawyer-rating services, like Martindale Hubbell, rate him highly. He
could assert that Avvo’s methodology for calculating lawyer ratings is flawed, using the
example of Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s middling rating as a case in point. He could, in short,
make many of the arguments that his lawyers made in his complaint to alert consumers to
the deficiencies of the Avvo rating and entice potential clients back into the fold. Just as
Congress has enacted § 230 of the C.D.A. to avoid chilling Internet-discussion, it or the
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courts should provide services like Avvo with immunity against tort suits stemming from
unflattering ratings, so long as the defendant offers the poorly rated individual or firm a
right of reply similar to eBay’s. Such a rule would permit a vendor to point out possible
biases that formed the basis for an unfair rating.
Reputation ratings systems are an alternative to formal adjudication and criminal
enforcement. In many cases, these systems will provide the most efficient mechanism for
resolving and deterring disputes. Bringing the complex, slow, and costly legal system
into run-of-the-mill disputes over whether Tavern on the Green’s décor rating should be a
24 or a 27, or whether Browne’s attorney score should be a 5.1 or a 6.2 endangers an
important and dynamic aspect of the nation’s private reputational infrastructure. The
result of legal liability here for reputation trackers will be fewer ratings, less information
for consumers, and greater reliance on more problematic bases for deciding upon an
attorney, like race, limited word-of-mouth data, law school attended, media visibility,
claims in attorney advertisements, and the like.
Of course, removing the possibility of liability in cases where inaccurate feedback
is reported on a ratings web site creates the potential for the quality of the published
feedback to suffer, just as eliminating defamation liability might cause the quality of
newspaper reporting to decline. That said, a decline in quality would by no means be
inevitable. The question in both cases is whether market forces provide adequate
incentives to keep the information on reputation rating sites generally accurate. With
respect to this question, it is appropriate to give a provisional affirmative answer.
Although there is always the potential for web sites providing biased product reviews to
receive heavy traffic, that has not happened. Consumer Reports, published by a nonprofit that accepts no advertising from the merchants whose products it reviews, vastly
outsells Consumer Guide, which is less objective and ad-supported. Search engines that
auction off the top responses to search queries do not have nearly as many users as those
that place more popular or more widely linked web pages at the top of their search
results. U.S. News & World Reports’ rankings of graduate schools and undergraduate
institutions, flawed though they may be, do not face serious competition from
publications that sell off top rankings to high bidding universities. To the extent that there
are variations in the extent to which web sites are objective, web sites that “rate the
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raters” can point out those web sites that consumers should view with suspicion. There
are, in short, rather robust mechanisms for promoting accuracy on reputation-rating sites,
and it seems far from clear that legal liability for potentially erroneous statements would
be welfare enhancing.

III.

A Normative Framework
I hope that careful readers of the preceding parts have not understood me to be a

cheerleader for the changes that have resulted and will result from the reputation
revolution. In some cases, the legal challenges posed by new technological capabilities
are wrenching, and in a few instances those challenges are so severe that they warrant
restricting the use of the technologies in question. Moreover, because the reputation
revolution seems poised to create a world that resembles the small towns of yore far more
than they resemble the urban and suburban environments in which most of us live,
readers should at least feel uneasy about the process by which we might achieve
heightened trust, reduced fraud, and decreased statistical discrimination.
A.

Some Thoughts About the Desirability of an Information Strategy

I try to limit the normative analysis in my scholarship, and this paper is no
exception. To be sure, there are places where normative analysis seems appropriate, and I
apply a rough welfarist cost-benefit analysis in those instances, but my primary objective
here is to identify the ways in which technological and social developments will alter the
foundational assumptions upon which the law is based, and then examine how the law
might respond to those developments. I do so for several reasons, mostly having to do
with my desire to engage as many readers as possible and help readers with conflicting
normative priors understand the stakes at issue in particular public policy domains. I am
not a moral philosopher, let alone a good one, so I see little reason why the reader should
care about my views on the propriety of various forms of discrimination.
At the same time, apparent normative judgments seem to manifest themselves
throughout this project. For example, I take the position here that some forms of
discrimination (e.g., statistical discrimination on the basis of race) are particularly
undesirable and other forms of discrimination (e.g., statistical discrimination manifested
as an unwillingness to hire ex-offenders, based on the supposition that an ex-offender is
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probably less trustworthy than an individual with no criminal record) are tolerable.
Although I do, in fact, believe that discrimination on the basis of race is worse than
discrimination on the basis of criminal history, it is not those priors that guide my
analysis here. Rather, my analysis is based on the premise that policymakers in all
jurisdictions have decided that racial discrimination is unlawful and lawmakers in most
jurisdictions have concluded that criminal history discrimination is not. I take these
judgments as a given, noting that nearly a dozen states have limited or even prohibited
the reliance on prior convictions as a basis for denying employment but that other
jurisdictions have prohibited ex-felons from working for the state government.227 Once
we recognize the choice between discrimination on the basis of race and discrimination
on the basis of criminal history, it is difficult to imagine anyone favoring the former over
the latter. In our world of imperfect enforcement of antidiscrimination laws, treating all
forms of discrimination as equally problematic ensures social welfare losses.
One useful way of getting at this legal hierarchy issue is through the lens of two
attributes that are connected, and that plausibly will prompt less consensus among readers
than the race versus criminal-history distinction. What is worse? Discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation or discrimination on the basis of HIV status? HIV positive
individuals are protected against discriminatory treatment by the Americans with
Disabilities Act.228 Yet some employers may still prefer to keep HIV-positive individuals
out of their workplaces, for reasons rational (e.g., concerns about rising group health
insurance premiums) or irrational (stubborn concerns about the possibility of HIV
transmission via casual contact). In the United States, the HIV virus historically has been
disproportionately prevalent among homosexual men, with male-to-male sexual contact
remaining the predominant method by which HIV positive Americans contracted the
disease.229
Given the substantial stigma associated with HIV and the relatively high costs of
providing health insurance for HIV-positive employees, it is likely that homosexual men
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are victimized by statistical discrimination designed to keep HIV positive individuals out
of the work place. One possible strategy for combating this statistical discrimination
would be to publicize the HIV status of every American. That would be a bad idea. As
demonstrated by the Americans with Disabilities Act, and a host of common law
decisions treating HIV status as a “private fact” whose disclosure is highly offensive to a
reasonable person,230 Americans have decided that HIV status itself ought to be a
protected classification, and decisions classifying individuals on the basis of HIV status
may be nearly as bad as decisions classifying them on the basis of race. Indeed, the
current absence of antidiscrimination protections for homosexuals (at least under federal
law) suggests that disclosing HIV status to prevent statistical discrimination against gays
would be undesirable.
But suppose a reader believes that the law has it wrong. Perhaps discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation is worse than discrimination against those with HIV on the
grounds of voluntariness, the centrality of a particular status to identity, historic
animosity, comparative threats of violence faced, public health considerations, or some
other basis. As long as the two forms of discrimination are not equally offensive, and the
other considerations discussed in Part II are satisfied, it would be appropriate, under this
framework, to publish individuals’ HIV status as a means of alleviating the statistical
discrimination that HIV-negative, out-of-the-closet gay men currently endure. Indeed,
perhaps paradoxically, publishing this information might encourage more gay men to
come out of the closet, which could benefit both homosexuals and heterosexuals. So in a
world where the law’s present hierarchy of antidiscrimination interests is flipped,
publishing individuals’ HIV status would make sense.
Things would get more complicated if the law decided that all anti-discrimination
is equally bad. Formally, the law holds that discrimination on the basis of race is
unlawful regardless of whether the victims are white males or African American females.
When one looks more closely at the allocation of government and private resources, at
popular attitudes, and the like, a more nuanced structure emerges. Discrimination on the
basis of race against African Americans is plainly regarded as worse than discrimination
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on the basis of race against Caucasians. African Americans and Native Americans are
given particularly strong protection because of the prevalence and intensity of the historic
disadvantage that they have faced. Discrimination on the basis of religion is bad, but it
has not exercised lawmakers or the public nearly to the same extent as discrimination on
the basis of race. To equate the two forms of discrimination is, as this paper shows, to
remove an important antidiscrimination tool from the law’s quiver.
B.

Incidence

The discussion so far has been premised on the idea that it is desirable to help
law-abiding African American males at the expense of African American males with
criminal records. To defend that proposition, it is worth exploring the counterarguments –
namely, why someone might want to make it more difficult for private decisionmakers to
sort among those with criminal records and those without criminal records. There are
several possible justifications for this approach. First, we might expect that those with
criminal records will be harmed more than those without criminal records will be helped.
Accordingly, facilitating effective private sorting will make the group of job applicants as
a whole worse off. Second, we might believe that there are powerful policy justifications
for preventing sorting, perhaps because we believe that criminals who have served their
time deserve a clean slate. Third, we might believe that the criminal justice system is
essentially corrupt, in which case facilitating sorting merely enhances the unjust penalties
meted out by an arbitrary government apparatus. Of these three arguments, only the last
one has significant force. I will consider them in turn.
First, the available empirical evidence suggests that African American males are
more likely to be hired by firms that conduct criminal background checks than by
similarly situated firms that do not. Recall that Holzer and his co-authors found that those
responsible for hiring appeared to overestimate the propensity of African American males
to have criminal records, and hire too few African Americans as a consequence.231
Publicizing accurate information about individuals’ involvement in the criminal justice
system should only adversely affect a group’s available opportunities to the extent that
decisionmakers (a) underestimate the prevalence of criminal records among members of
231
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a particular group, or (b) are effectively prevented from engaging in statistical
discrimination to sort out those with criminal records. The Holzer study undercuts both
claims in the race-criminal history context. What’s more, it is plausible that
decisionmakers in employment settings are more risk-averse232 with respect to
erroneously hiring someone with a criminal background than they are about not hiring
someone without a criminal background. If decisionmakers are risk averse in that way,
but they are not particularly risk averse about the prospect of antidiscrimination liability,
then publicizing information about who has a criminal record may make the group that
was previously the target of statistical discrimination better off as a whole. To the extent
that we are concerned about the welfare of a group that is victimized by statistical
discrimination, we should limit anti-sorting strategies to those settings in which
employers are engaging in statistical discrimination while at the same time
underestimating the correlation between a group classification and an undesirable
characteristic.
Alternatively, we might think that private sorting creates negative externalities,
and justify keeping criminal histories obscure for that reason. For example, we might
believe on policy grounds that the availability of employment opportunities for ex-cons
will discourage recidivism. Alternatively, we might have an abstract ideological
commitment to the proposition that “everyone deserves a second chance,” or, more
narrowly, that “someone who has served his time has repaid his debt to society and
should be able to start off with a clean slate.” These sorts of arguments sometimes find
their way into the information privacy case law233 and academic literature.234 In this case,
the appropriate question to ask is what is the optimal strategy for preventing these
negative externalities. The sensible way to answer this question is by drawing on the
tools of optimal redistribution analysis.
It would seem that the best way to facilitate the hiring of ex-cons who deserve a
second chance is through direct subsidies to employers who hire them. Such programs
have been implemented, with the discontinued federal Targeted Jobs Tax Credit
232
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providing one example235 and the current federal tax code’s Work Opportunity Credit
providing another.236 Because it is inexpensive for the government to identify ex-cons,
the government can efficiently ensure that only genuine ex-cons benefit from the
subsidized second chances.237 And since the program is funded out of general tax
revenues, the costs of promoting second chances is borne by taxpayers as a whole.
Compare that regime to the status quo. We try to facilitate the hiring of ex-cons by
raising private decisionmakers’ costs of sorting between ex-cons and those with no
criminal records. As a result, many employers use statistical discrimination tools to
penalize non-ex-cons, and the ex-cons who do get hired are likely to be members of
groups whose baseline offending rates are low – white males, and females of all races.
Under the present system, only some of the beneficiaries of the existing “promote second
chances through information obscurity” program are actually ex-cons, and the costs of
this program fall heavily on a group that includes other ex-cons and innocent people who
share demographic characteristics with ex-cons. From an optimal redistribution
perspective, there is little reason238 to prefer our present approach to a tax credit?239
The final justification for obscuring information about criminal offenses is
connected to disturbing inequalities within the criminal justice system. More precisely, if
the criminal justice system is systematically biased against African Americans, Latinos,
or men, then a system whereby the government publicizes the crimes of African
Americans, Latinos, and men will worsen existing inequality. This argument comes the
closest to providing a compelling reason for suppressing criminal history information
about individuals. If criminal punishments are indeed meted out arbitrarily to members of
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minority groups, then a Rawlsian should reject the proposal that I have advanced,240
though a welfarist should not.241 To a Rawlsian, some for of reputational affirmative
action would be necessary to render a searchlight strategy desirable in the employment of
ex-cons context.242
If we accept a softened version of the “arbitrary criminal justice system” thesis,
then we certainly need not reject the approach defended here. More precisely, even in a
nation whose criminal justice system discriminates systematically against African
American males, there may be important, merit-related differences between those African
American males who have criminal records and those who do not. Some of the former
will be innocent, but surely virtually all of the latter will be innocent. Indeed, because the
criminal justice system is biased against African American males, those African
American males who nevertheless avoid run-ins with the law should be particularly
desirable employees in the market for jobs where trustworthiness is important and the
applicant pool contains a large number of untrustworthy job seekers. Why shouldn’t we
help decisionmakers identify these particularly desirable individuals with greater ease?
C.

Social Meaning

It is possible to critique the optimal redistribution analysis put forth above while
staying within a welfarist framework. The analysis would proceed as follows: Outright
prohibitions on discriminatory conduct are preferable to subsidies for non-discriminatory
conduct because the former will instill or strengthen anti-discrimination norms and the
latter will not. By this logic, the implementation of prohibitive discrimination policies
will eventually change the preferences of the populace, making the discriminatory
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impulse rarer in the long run.243 A policy that permits discrimination but subsidizes
employment of the discriminated-against group, on the other hand, might signal tacit
approval of the discriminatory conduct at issue, perhaps making discrimination more
socially acceptable (and hence more prevalent) in the long run.244
The story has intuitive appeal, and the hypothesized effect is plausible, but there
are equally plausible stories we can tell that will drag us in the opposite direction. In
essence, the social meaning argument for prohibitions on discriminatory conduct is
analogous to the social meaning argument for command-and-control environmental
regulation rather than market-based approaches like pollution taxes and tradable
emissions permits. In that context, Michael Sandel has hypothesized that trying to
regulate greenhouse gasses through any strategy other than command-and-control will
weaken environmental norms,245 and I have argued that the available empirical evidence
suggests precisely the opposite – putting a price tag on something like pollution causes
individuals to value previously undervalued environmental resources, weakens the
impetus to flout laws that are perceived to be draconian, and can actually strengthen
environmental norms.246
The question of whether tax subsidies for firms that employ ex-convicts are
desirable is an empirical one on which there is conflicting evidence. A widely-cited 1985
study by Gary Burtless suggests that welfare-recipient job seekers whose employment
was subsidized fared poorly in the labor market, because the presence of the voucher
signaled employers that the applicants were on welfare, and employers otherwise would
have had difficulty discerning who was a welfare recipient.247 As a result of this research
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and important subsequent legal scholarship by Anne Alstott, some legal scholars have
taken a dim view of targeted tax credits.248 Yet more recent work suggests that the
program Burtless studied was designed so as to maximize the welfare stigma,249 and that
well-designed tax incentives to employ disadvantaged workers can be effective at
increasing their employment.250 And perhaps more to the point, Burtless, Alstott, and
other contributors to this field have not explored the troubling possibility that in the
absence of a tax subsidy program that helps employers sort between the disadvantaged
and the non-disadvantaged, employers instead sort between the white and black.
A final, and related question concerns the social meaning of government
information policy. When the government chooses to publish information about attribute
A but not attribute B, the populace may understand this policy as an indication that
attribute A is relevant or salient but attribute B is not.251 This is part of a plausible critique
of Megan’s Laws, which disclose information about sex offenders’ criminal histories and
whereabouts without disclosing the same information about murderers who have
completed their sentences, causing communities to over-react to the presence of some exoffenders and under-react to the presence of others.252 The theoretically attractive
solution to this problem is to release as much information as possible, relying on private
actors to distill this information into a format that consumers can use readily.
D.

Price Discrimination

The greater availability of consumers’ personal information enables forms of
price discrimination that would not have been feasible prior to the reputation revolution.
Price discrimination can take multiple forms, but the classic example is of “a firm
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charging multiple prices for the same good where the difference in price is not
attributable to a corresponding difference in cost.”253 To take a short-lived but notorious
example, Amazon.com began using information from Internet cookies to engage in
dynamic pricing: Loyal customers who frequently bought from Amazon were charged
higher prices and customers who were directed to Amazon from comparison-shopping
web sites were charged less.254 Amazon dropped the practice in the face of significant
customer complaints.255 Yet, Amazon’s reliance on proxies like repeat purchases or use
of a bargain-hunting web site necessarily entails lumping together groups of consumers –
a practice that the economics literature refers to as third-degree price discrimination.256
Amazon could extract much more consumer surplus if it was able to charge prices that
perfectly reflected each consumer’s willingness to pay for a product – what economists
call first-degree price discrimination.257 Put another way, in the absence of perfect
information about every individual, price discriminating firms are required to statistically
discriminate in their pricing policies.
The widespread availability of personal information about individuals’ behaviors,
preferences, and reputations enables firms to shift toward behavior that more closely
approximates first-degree price discrimination.258 Provided that selling firms have some
market power, can limit arbitrage, and are marketing to consumers possessing varied
price elasticities of demand, price discrimination will enable those firms to capture what
would otherwise be consumer welfare under a fixed pricing model.259
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Price discrimination is prohibited by law only where it adversely affects consumer
welfare.260 This is as it should be: The effects of price discrimination, unlike the effects
of racial discrimination, are ambiguous. Perfect first-degree price discrimination will
enable a firm to increase output, improving social welfare, but at the cost of a diversion
of surplus from consumers to producers.261 The welfare effects of third-degree price
discrimination are quite context-dependent, by contrast.262 Moreover, even the
distributional consequences of price discrimination are indeterminate. While price
discrimination necessarily shifts surplus away from consumers, it also enables poor
consumers who would otherwise be unable to afford a product the opportunity to obtain it
(at a reduced price.) For that reason, price discrimination often entails a progressive
redistribution of resources.263 In short, the desirability of price discrimination is
ultimately an empirical question with varied answers in different contexts. Sometimes,
the existing empirical work suggests that the benefits of price discrimination outweigh
the harms.264 We simply do not know the welfare or distributional consequences of
facilitating price discrimination in e-commerce generally, in landlord-tenant markets, in
immigration decisionmaking, or in most of the other settings that I discuss herein. But we
do know that price discrimination considerations should be an essential part of the
calculus in determining when search lights or curtains are desirable.
E.

The “Am I Hot or Not?” Society

In October of 2000, James Hong launched a strange new web site called
www.amihotornot.com.265 In the web site’s first month of operation, more than 20,000
individuals submitted photographs (of themselves, typically) to the web site so that other
users could rate their physical attractiveness on a scale of 1 to 10.266 Although many
Americans scratched their heads about the web site’s success, the site was a viral hit with
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teenagers and young adults, and remains online and popular today, though it has morphed
into some combination of a beauty rating site and an Internet dating site.267
In the intervening years, cultural trends have suggested at least a limited embrace
of the rate-me-mentality exemplified by amihotornot. Millions of Americans have begun
blogging about their personal thoughts, sharing their homemade videos on Youtube, and
dreaming about competing on American Idol, which is in the midst of a strong run as the
most popular television show in the United States. Not long before a scandal involving a
referee’s alleged involvement in game-fixing, N.B.A. Commission David Stern bragged
that professional basketball referees were the “most ranked, rated, reviewed, statistically
analyzed, and mentored group of employees of any company in any place in the
world.”268 Those of us in the academy can relate to these referees, as we have come to
expect that our teaching will be evaluated by students at the end of a course and perhaps
via web sites like ratemyprofessor.com. And, of course, our writing will be evaluated by
tenure committees, lateral search committees at competitor schools, and, inevitably,
workshop attendees. Being evaluated unfavorably always stings, but one premise of this
paper is that being evaluated unfavorably on the basis of individuated criteria stings less,
and is less socially harmful, than being evaluated unfavorably on the basis of membership
in a protected group.269
What are the effects of this observation on people? There is a slowly growing
empirical literature that addresses this question. Employees in many industries face
constant evaluation by co-workers, customers, and supervisors, and sociologists have
explored the effects of being a call center employee whose actions are constantly under
surveillance. Insofar as business-related calls were being monitored and recorded, they
prompted little employee resistance.270 Similarly, when researchers at Stanford began
studying the effects of publishing feedback generated by speed-dating encounters
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between opposite sex experiment subjects, they found some surprising results.271 The
researchers matched up pairs of people and asked them to provide feedback about their
fellow research subject’s behavior in the speed-dating exercise. In some variations, the
feedback was kept private, and in other circumstances, each partner’s feedback about the
other partner was publicized. Moreover, in some variations, the feedback included
substantive comments, whereas in other variations it consisted entirely of numerical
scoring.272 Participants were asked to assess the extent to which they felt monitored,
conformist, and self-conscious in the various experimental set-ups. They reported that
having numerical feedback about them made public, but without any basis for the
feedback, felt most invasive, most conformist, and made them most-self conscious.273
Feedback that was shared with both parties was more acceptable to everyone, and
numerical feedback accompanied by substantive explanations for the scores was viewed
as far more acceptable than numerical feedback alone.274 If this result is broadly
generalizable, and some research in very different contexts suggests at least parts of it
may be, 275 then it suggests that ordinary people may be willing to embrace ubiquitous
feedback systems, provided they are sufficiently transparent and universal.
There is, of course, an important difference between the amihotornot submitters,
small-town residents, call center employees, speed daters, referees, and professors whose
activities are evaluated frequently, and those whose activities are rarely, if ever, subject to
evaluations. The difference is consent. For the reasons identified above, the option of
removing one’s self from the reputation nation will be more of a theoretical possibility
than a practical one. If an individual chooses to opt out of using reputation-tracking
technologies, then many people understandably will assume the worst about that
individual.276 Privacy theorists have long argued that protecting privacy is essential so
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that individuals can relax,277 experiment with different personalities to figure out who
they truly are,278 or develop the insights that will make them more productive citizens.279
True enough, the private sphere of the home will remain a respite largely free of rating,
and there will be market demand for zones of privacy where everyone will agree to
suspend the use of rating technologies – it is easy to imagine the proprietors of the Las
Vegas strip going this route, though it seems likely that they would first establish
minimum reputational requirements for entry into the reputation-free zone. The question,
though, is whether those zones of privacy are sufficient to prevent the societal harms to
which privacy theorists have pointed. In line with the peculiarities of Americans’
attitudes toward privacy generally,280 and the well-recognized dangers of surveillance in
one-party states,281 the answer may well hinge on the extent to which the state can be
prevented from utilizing widely available personal information to identify, intimidate, or
otherwise disfavor members and supporters of the political opposition.

IV.

Conclusion
The technological tools that can curtail anonymity and obscurity in the public

sphere already exist or will soon exist. During the next decade, the collectivity of
consumers will get to decide whether and to what extent to accept these technologies.
The analysis in this paper is premised on the intuition that such technologies will be
embraced by consumers to a substantial degree, but there is another way to read this
paper. My argument here can also be read as an exploration of some of the unrecognized
costs and benefits that will flow from enhanced reputational infrastructure. The reputation
revolution envisioned here ought to cause us to revise our thinking about much of the
law, and this paper has identified some of the challenges that it will pose for property
law, antidiscrimination law, health law, insurance law, immigration law, and consumer
protection law. That list is by no means meant to be exhaustive, and one ambition of this
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paper is to encourage readers to assess how other bodies of law might need to be revised
and reassessed in light of possibly looming technological developments.
Readers might take any number of points away from the preceding discussion, but
let me conclude by underscoring the ones that strike me as the most important. First and
foremost, information policy is an underutilized and undertheorized tool for the state to
influence the behavior of private parties. This paper has suggested that there will be
settings in which the government can reduce the prevalence of unlawful discrimination
by publicizing previously private information about individuals. For example, the best
available empirical evidence suggests that publicizing criminal history information could
reduce racial discrimination in the employment of blue collar and service workers.
Pushing the point further, the paper wonders whether a similar strategy might reduce the
prevalence of statistical discrimination in the prescription of narcotics and the pricing of
automobile insurance premiums. At the same time, the paper reminds us of the pitfalls of
this strategy in instances where government research into individuals’ backgrounds and
subsequent dissemination of the information gleaned might prompt segments of the
populace to rely on undesirable self-help strategies. Jury duty may well be one such
context. Government information policy also may be a poor strategy in those settings
where irrational discrimination is more prevalent than rational discrimination, where
traditional law enforcement deters discrimination quite well, or where there are
significant social benefits that arise when the poor treatment of secretly privileged people
sparks a useful debate on matters of distributive justice.
Second, optimal public policy design must take account of the availability of a
private market for reputation information. In regulating the landlord-tenant market, protenant reformers’ failed to anticipate the reputational repercussions of insisting on
summary proceedings as the sole avenue for evicting tenants. In the immigration context,
a comparative analysis of reputational infrastructure in the developed and developing
world demonstrates the possible appeal of a bifurcated immigration policy – one that
focuses on pre-entry-screening for residents of developed nations and post-entrysurveillance for residents of nations with poor reputation infrastructures. And in the
consumer protection sector, blindness to the benefits of reputation monitoring services
might render the law too quick to encourage private litigation and (more ominously) too
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eager to impose liability on valuable services that provides cheaper, more efficient, and
maybe even more satisfying mechanisms for resolving and deterring garden-variety
disputes. The law must not impose defamation liability on reputation rating sites without
first exploring the powerful social and technological correctives that may be better suited
to the reputation rating world than they were to the traditional print and broadcast media.
Third, and finally, the reputation revolution presents a number of thorny tradeoffs
that legal scholars and policymakers should begin to discuss. Should society create a
hierarchy of unlawful discrimination, so that it tolerates government actions that reduce
race discrimination by facilitating, say, employment status discrimination? What effects
will information-based government antidiscrimination policies have on related social
norms? Can a society obtain the benefits of substantial coveillance (private citizens
watching each other, and disclosing what they see) without encountering the threats that
arise from excessive surveillance (the state watching its citizens)?282 These are pressing
questions without obvious answers, and this paper has sketched out some initial
responses.
While many readers will recoil instinctively at some of the scenarios described
herein, this paper has tried to add texture to the imminent debate over these issues by
asking whether we might also want to recoil at some of the pathologies generated by
environments in which individual reputation information is in short supply. Most of us
live in such an environment, though that is changing quickly, and as a consequence we
seem to have more unlawful employment discrimination than is necessary, more distrust
between doctors and patients than is appropriate, immigration policies that are less
sensible than they should be, and dispute resolution procedures for garden-variety
disagreements that are more cumbersome and frustrating than they ought to be.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Lior J. Srahilevitz
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
lior@uchicago.edu
282

For a discussion, see Mann et al., supra note 275, at 338, 346-48.
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